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ABSTRACT 
 
The rapid advancement and implementation of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICTs) has made the ‘digital world’ an inseparable part of contemporary 
societies. We have e-commerce, e-democracy, e-administration and e-‘just about 
anything’. Underlying these digital solutions is the understanding of a borderless and 
networked world with more and more decentralized states. Globalization pressures thus 
have the states thinking how to harness the potential of ICTs while upholding their core 
values. The answer seems to lie in learning how to collectively construct the information 
society – through horizontal and vertical, transnational and sub-national cooperation. As 
such, societies are increasingly moving towards polycentric forms of governance that 
span across state borders and help to accommodate the complexity of modern challenges. 
This thesis explores how globalization pressures facilitate the diffusion of power in the 
example of digital cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region (BSR), exploring how it has 
emerged and what it is like in this day and age. For this, a theoretical synthesis is 
developed between the concepts of regionalism, digitization and multi-level governance, 
serving as an analytical framework for advancing the central case study. Through a 
combination of methods including process-tracing and expert interviewing, the thesis will 
explore digital cooperation networks in the BSR so to arrive at a wider understanding of 
the emerging multi-level governance model in the regional digital agenda.   
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) has often been dubbed an innovative test-bed, a dynamic 
experiment, a regional powerhouse and a competitiveness frontrunner, yet the bulk of 
research on BSR cooperation addresses the more conventional aspects of environment, 
security and economy. Though these areas have formed and defined the kind of 
cooperation that takes place in the region, a shift towards the future avenues of regional 
cooperation is needed in order to keep up with and theorize the dynamic developments of 
the region. This is especially relevant in light of the region’s image as a macro-regional 
model where new ideas are tested and problems tackled on the level of a region. 
Innovation, of course, occurs in all conceivable fields of cooperation, but recently, one of 
the most pronounced debates on the regional level has been that of cross-border digital 
cooperation, arguably largely fuelled by the Digital Agenda flagship of the EU 2020 
Strategy. There is a general consensus on the benefits of a functioning digital market in 
supporting economic growth in the BSR, the rationale for doing so − a report by Baltic 
Development Forum and the Baltic Chambers of Commerce Association (BDF 2012) 
estimates that cross-border barriers in the digital area cost at least 45 billion euros 
annually in the BSR alone − as well as the main priority areas to focus on (i.e. e-
procurement, public sector information and open data, roaming services, online 
intermediaries), yet the question of how to release and realize this huge growth potential 
remains contested.  
On a more theoretical level, the understanding that cross-border digital cooperation is 
crucial to the competitiveness of the region is somewhat puzzling. After all, everything 
that is digital should know no borders as physical presence and geographical proximity 
no longer matter thanks to modern ICTs. Information is collected, accessed, stored, 
transmitted and exploited digitally and thus globally. Yet, there seems to be a consensus 
that the global and all-embracing phenomenon of digitization needs to be addressed in a 
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geographically restricted cooperative context in the BSR. This paradigm is clearly worth 
a closer exploration as a sneak peak into the emerging areas of regional cooperation and 
the logic behind it. For this, however, the conceptual divide between globalizing on the 
one hand and regionalizing on the other needs to be crossed. 
Regardless of the theoretical controversy, the pragmatic question remains: how can the 
potential of digitization be realized in the regional context? This thesis argues that the 
BSR has already figured out how - a networked multi-level governance model is emerging 
in the BSR, demonstrating a shift from state-centric cooperation initiatives to a complex 
interplay of various actor networks in the area of digital cooperation. Each offering their 
individual contributions to diminishing digital barriers in the region, the developing 
networks are claimed to govern digital cooperation in the BSR, although still in a very 
fragmented manner. In this light, the thesis aims to find out how these networks have 
developed, who they are and how they relate to each other in shaping a governance model 
for BSR digital cooperation. As an introductory piece of research in the pool of 
regionalism studies, the thesis thus seeks to form a wider perspective of digital 
cooperation in the BSR. 
The overall research design of the thesis can be visualized as follows: 
 
Graph 1: Research design of the thesis 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Relevance of the research 
As an introductory piece of research on the digital dimension of regional cooperation, the 
relevance and originality of the thesis can be summarized through academic, theoretical 
and policy aspects: 
 Academic relevance – raising awareness of the recently established regional 
networks that contribute to the digital growth of the BSR and turning the attention 
of region studies to the highly dynamic and fast-developing area of digitization so 
to encourage further research and the development of analytical approaches in the 
currently scarce digital cooperation literature that would support future policy-
making.  
 Theoretical relevance – developing a synthesis of the seemingly distant concepts 
of regionalism, digitization and multi-level governance based on their mutual 
commitment to globalization phenomena so to propose a theoretical framework 
suitable for analyzing digital cooperation in regional settings. Thus, regionalism 
literature will be complemented with an understanding of why and how 
globalization processes (in the example of digitization) result in the 
decentralization of regional cooperation. 
 Policy relevance – analyzing the development and current state of BSR digital 
cooperation in order to reveal the greatest barriers in shaping a regional digital 
single market and to outline potential for policy improvement on the EU, national 
as well as sub-national levels. 
 
Research aim 
Proceeding from the abovementioned study focus, the thesis aims to form a 
comprehensive understanding of the development and current state of BSR digital 
cooperation through mapping and analyzing the most prominent digital networks that 
have emerged. In line with this, the research questions are the following: 
1. How has digital cooperation developed in the BSR regional context? 
2. How is MLG expressed in today’s BSR digital cooperation? 
3. What form of digital cooperation do we have in the BSR?  
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In order to answer these questions, the case study of BSR digital cooperation will be 
placed in a theoretical framework that combines the principles of regionalism, the global 
phenomenon of digitization and the analytical tools provided by the multi-level 
governance model.  
 
Research methods 
Framed by the theoretical synthesis, BSR digital cooperation will be explored as a single 
case study in a two-step process. First of all, the decisive developments that together 
conditioned the emergence of digital cooperation in the BSR will be process-traced in a 
retrospective approach. The pre-institutionalized setting of the BSR as well as the 
region’s embeddedness in wider EU governance are thereby treated as the principal 
‘deciding factors’. This introduction to the logic of BSR digital cooperation will be 
followed by the second, main phase, which seeks to account for BSR digital cooperation 
as it is today. This will be done by exploring the case – BSR digital cooperation – on five 
distinct levels of governance, thereby combining desk research for identifying and 
categorizing relevant actor networks with expert interviews for further investigating the 
experience and interconnectedness of the mapped networks in shaping BSR digital 
governance. The results from process-tracing and interviewing will thereafter be tied back 
to theoretical assumptions and a conclusion will be reached regarding what is the 
governance of BSR digital cooperation like and why it has developed the way it has. 
 
Limitations of the research 
As the current pool of research on the topic of digital cooperation in the BSR is scarce 
and links with other studies are difficult to find, the thesis aims at describing the related 
governance structure in a comprehensive way – indicating that the analyses cannot go 
into minor detail. This, however, suggests diverse opportunities for further research. Also, 
as digital cooperation in the BSR in general is found to be just emerging, this also 
necessitates that a wide range of digital cooperation topics are included that cannot be 
easily compared by topic – rather, what are accounted for are general insights and 
cooperation patterns. As this can be counted as a limitation, the benefits of a 
comprehensive framework will be highlighted as an introduction to the topic that deserves 
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more scholarly interest. Also, contrary to the mainstream literature on e-services and e-
governance, the current research will not assume a technocratic approach (e.g. 
interoperability of services and ease of use) to digital cooperation, rather concentrating 
on analyzing the overall cooperation setting (e.g. trends, obstacles) through a theoretical 
lens.  
 
Organization of the thesis 
The thesis is organized into four main chapters surrounded by introductions and 
conclusions. The first of these aims to explain the three main concepts that help to place 
BSR digital cooperation as a study focus into an analytical framework. This involves 
elaborating on the principles of regionalism, the phenomenon of digitization and the 
multi-level governance lens, resulting in a synthesis and a set of theoretical assumptions 
that will help to interpret the observations of the empirical part. The second chapter 
concentrates on justifying the case selection and outlines a two-step methodology for 
exploring digital cooperation in the BSR. The two methods – process-tracing and 
interviewing – will in turn form chapters three and four, accounting for the development 
of BSR digital cooperation so far and the current state of cooperation. This will lead up 
to the final analysis that ties together the results of process-tracing and interviewing with 
the theoretical assumptions, resulting in an understanding of the kind of digital 
cooperation we have in the BSR.
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
Theoretical framework: regions, governance and everything digital 
 
The first chapter elaborates on the three underlying concepts and their relation to one 
another in the context of this study. The aim is to demonstrate that despite seeming like 
conceptually somewhat distant theoretical components, regionalism, digitization and 
multi-level governance all share a strong commitment to theorizing globalization 
processes, enabling to develop a synthesis appropriate for analyzing digital cooperation 
in a regional context. After conceptualizing these three components, thus, a theoretical 
synthesis suitable for this thesis will be developed, whereas each component is ascribed 
a specific conceptual role – regionalism as providing the scope, digitization as the focus 
and MLG as the lens. Based on these components, a set of theoretical assumptions will 
be proposed about the essence of digital cooperation in the BSR, leading up to the 
empirical part of the thesis. 
 
1.1. Regionalism studies 
The end of the Cold War has witnessed a resurgence of regionalism studies. This is mostly 
conditioned by the proliferation of regional institutions, which has given rise to 
substantial academic interest in both their sources as well as consequences. A wealth of 
studies have been conducted by students of economics who are interested in regionalism’s 
welfare implications for the stability of the international system. Besides economists, 
however, regionalism has also been subject to increasing attention by political scientists 
– scholars of international relations and comparative politics have produced a sizeable 
amount of literature on regionalism phenomena. (Mansfield & Solingen 2010: 146)  
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Regionalism studies seem to arrive at the first obstacle already when trying to find a clear-
cut definition for the underlying concept – a region. Langenhove (2013: 475) finds it 
striking that although throughout regionalism studies, there has emerged an insight that 
regions are central to our understanding of world politics, the concept of region itself is 
hardly problematized. This conceptual vagueness, he claims, does not only have 
implications for the theoretical and empirical quality of research, but also hinders 
effective policy-making (Ibid.: 475-476). Indeed, if understandings of regions differ 
considerably depending on who is studying the concept, it would follow that each and 
every study of regions is valid in its own right, but it is another story regarding the wider 
applicability of the findings. 
In the first wave of regionalism studies from the 1950s to the mid-1970s, there was a 
tendency to take a ‘scientific’ approach to defining regions by identifying relationships 
between regionalism and other factors like social, economic, political and organizational 
cohesiveness (cf. Russett, Cantori, Spiegel) (Hameiri 2013: 317). Geography was 
generally treated as one of the main deciding factors in distinguishing between a region 
and a non-region. For instance, one of the early contributors to regionalism literature, Nye 
(1968: xii) asserts that a region is ‘a limited number of states linked together by a 
geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence’. This definition 
combines the essence of a region in three main aspects; namely, a region embraces a 
limited number of ‘members’, it has emerged owing to geographical proximity and thus 
also fosters increased interactions, which in turn leads to intensified cooperation.  
A major milestone in regionalism studies was moving away from the geographical focus 
of regions. Katzenstein (2005 cited by Medrano 2007: 1257), for instance, concludes that 
regions should be seen as institutionally patterned interactions between states, not as 
geographic objects. This new approach does not acknowledge the existence of ‘natural’ 
regions and the underlying assumption is that ‘all regions are socially constructed and 
hence politically contested’ (Hurrell 1995: 38-9 cited by Hettne 2005: 544). In order to 
describe this shift of emphasis, the concept of ‘regionness’ was introduced as a process 
‘whereby a geographical area is transformed from a passive object to an active subject 
capable of articulating the transnational interests of the emerging region’ (Hettne & 
Söderbaum 2000: 361). Thus, contemporary regionalism studies seem to share a meta-
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theoretical consensus that regions are ‘politically made’ (Katzenstein 2005: 9) and can 
thus be seen as actors. 
Similarly to regions, regionalism has often been referred to as an ‘elusive’ concept 
(Mansfield & Milner 1999 cited by Yi 2007: 4) – one that has attracted considerable 
academic attention in various fields of social sciences, but one that still remains contested 
after more than sixty years of debate. Indeed, from theorizing the European integration 
project since its inception, extending the interest beyond the European case after the Cold 
War and bringing attention to the latest ‘old’ versus ‘new’ regionalism dichotomy, it can 
be said that regionalism studies are yet to produce a ‘grand’ theory which could 
accommodate the variety of cases explored. As regions increasingly attract academic 
interest, however, there is a need for conceptual clarifications, or as Fawn (2009 cited by 
Langenhove 2013: 476) concludes, regions are ‘difficult to theorize, while making that 
also a necessity.’ 
Hettne has suggested that defining the ‘region words’ is somewhat of a dead end because 
the concepts are ‘moving targets’. The problem is both ontological as well as 
epistemological – if there is little common ground regarding what we actually study when 
we study regionalism, there cannot be any agreement regarding how we should study it. 
(Hettne 2005: 543) Moreover, as if the circumstance that e.g. comparative politics, 
international relations and international political economy each have their own 
understanding of how to approach regionalism does not complicate matters enough, we 
also have to take into account the drastic increase and growing complexity of regional 
arrangements (Behr & Jokela 2011: 3). As a result, we are left with a concept which varies 
across time and specialization, but which is nevertheless essential to tackle in order to 
explore these ‘regional arrangements’. 
As a response to these conceptual challenges, the following sub-sections present a brief 
account of the ‘region words’ in an attempt to explain which connotations regionalism 
has in this thesis. Dichotomies such as old vs new regionalism, regionalism vs 
regionalization and regional cooperation vs regional integration are thereby used in order 
to break regionalism down into analytical categories. This brief visit to the realm of 
regionalism studies will once again prove that the phenomenon is surrounded by large 
15 | P a g e  
 
conceptual pluralism, making it necessary to establish some points of departure before 
moving on.  
 
1.1.1. Old and new regionalism 
Arguably the most important dichotomy in the context of this thesis is old vs new 
regionalism with the thesis taking the latter approach. Underlying the debate is the claim 
that formerly accepted regionalism principles have become outdated as the character and 
functions of regions have recently experienced major transformations. This, in turn, has 
had a significant impact on the relative weights given to various levels of analysis – e.g. 
the global, regional, national and sub-national levels – and the links between them, 
whereby emphasis is shifting both upward and downward from the national level. 
(Väyrynen 2003: 26, 41) In order to bring more clarity to the old vs new regionalism 
differences, Söderbaum (2007: 187) proposes three main characteristics that discern the 
approaches: 
 Actors – whereas old regionalist studies are dominated by states and 
intergovernmental regional organizations, new regionalism looks beyond state 
domination and also accounts for the market, civil society and external actors; 
 Areas of cooperation – whereas the old regionalist paradigm prescribes that 
cooperation takes places in clearly delimited sectors (especially trade and 
security), new regionalism acknowledges that cooperation happens on a 
variety of fronts simultaneously, with strong sectorial linkages; 
 Policy orientation – whereas old regionalist studies describe policy as 
introverted and often protectionist, new regionalism claims that policy is 
extroverted, usually directly linked with globalization.  
It can be said that the distinction between old and new regionalism boils down to agency. 
Namely, authors tend to divide into two regarding whether to treat states as the actors 
behind regionalism ‘efforts’ or whether to allow for a broader level beyond that of states. 
For example, Payne and Gamble (1996 cited by Hettne 2005: 545) emphasize that 
regionalism denotes a ‘state-led or states-led project designed to reorganize a particular 
regional space along defined economic and political lines’, whereas Hveem (2003, ibid.) 
refers to ‘an identifiable group of actors’ that drive the project, therefore not confining 
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the agency exclusively to states. Despite the fact that regionalism can be treated as a 
political project in both cases, new regionalism has been claimed to mean ‘the return of 
the political’, but not necessarily ‘the return of (political) leaders’ (Väyrynen 2003: 41).  
Besides differences in agency, new regionalism also has a distinct relationship with wider 
globalization processes, though the nature of this relationship is still very much contested. 
Hveem (cited by Spindler 2002:4) exemplifies this debate by saying that new regionalist 
studies come to the rather inconclusive conclusion that new regionalism may represent 
globalization or attempt to ride on it, to regulate it or to resist it. More important than the 
exact relationship, however, is the understanding that regionalism is a response to the 
need for systematizing globalization processes in a smaller scale to make them more 
graspable. In line with this, Väyrynen (2003: 26) claims that globalization came to the 
new regionalist agenda in the late 1980s, when various regional organizations became 
more common, indicating the ‘need to react to the pressures created by economic 
globalization through local means’. This, in turn, is closely connected to the rationale of 
keeping and/or increasing the competitiveness of regional actors through a wider regional 
‘arrangement’, or as Pelagidis and Papasotiriou (cited by Spindler 2002:4) put it, ‘national 
actors may perceive regionalism as a defense mechanism against the competitive 
pressures arising from the globalization processes’.  
This brings us back to the initial ‘puzzle’ – if digitization as a global phenomenon knows 
no borders, why should it be tackled in a regional setting? The seemingly incompatible 
concepts turn out to have close linkages. New regionalism provides a suitable framework 
to link together globalization as a worldwide phenomenon and regionalism as a response 
and means to maintain competitiveness in the global economic landscape. In the same 
lines, the pressure to digitize leads states to pursue regional arrangements as a defense 
mechanism so to collectively respond to the challenges and realize the benefits of 
economies of scale. Thus, new areas emerge in regional cooperation that surpass the 
traditional trade and security issues. On the other hand, new regionalism helps to account 
for new patterns of interaction between state and non-state actors that emerge in these 
cooperative arrangements. The understanding of a ‘group of actors’ leading a regionalism 
project is thereby crucial to the empirical part of this study, whereby the actors driving 
BSR digital cooperation will be identified. 
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1.1.2. Regionalism and regionalization 
Contrary to the ease of dichotomizing old and new regionalism, regionalism and 
regionalization cannot be seen as contending concepts in this study. In order to clarify 
this, the main distinction between regionalism and regionalization as advanced by 
Söderbaum (2007: 188) can be used: 
 Regionalism refers to a policy or a project, whereby state and non-state actors 
cooperate and coordinate strategy within a particular region, driving a formal 
program that often leads to institution-building; 
 Regionalization represents the process of cooperation, integration, cohesion 
and identity-creating in a regional space that does not necessarily mean 
anything more than a concentration of activity of trade, people and ideas. 
As such, regionalism denotes ‘formal, state-led projects of region-making that often 
involve a certain degree of institutionalization’, whereas regionalization has come to 
mean ‘the growth of societal integration within a region and the often undirected 
processes of social and economic interaction’ (Hurrell 1995: 334). The former can thereby 
be seen as referring to top-down and political practices, complying with Breslin and 
Higgott’s (2000: 344) understanding of regionalism as those state-led projects of 
cooperation that emerge as a result of intergovernmental dialogue and treaties, whereas 
the latter rather describes a ‘societal, bottom-up, often economically-driven process that 
is in constant flux’ (Mansfield & Solingen 2010 cited by Behr & Jokela 2011: 4).  
Regionalism in its essence is thus a formal project (policy program) deliberately driven 
by governments, whereas regionalization is an unplanned process that occurs 
spontaneously and simultaneously on several levels. In this study, the two concepts are 
seen as complementary rather than exclusive – whereas regionalism provides the funds 
and infrastructure for regionalization processes to occur, regionalization in turn can 
highlight the need for ‘more state’ and regulatory mechanisms in some areas (Wunderlich 
2013). Thus, although regionalization is more spontaneous in nature, it does not mean 
that it is detached from politics. Accepting complementarity between regionalism and 
regionalization is thereby in line with multi-level governance, which seeks to account for 
both top-down as well as bottom-up policy-forming and implementation processes 
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through various governance networks. Thus, the underlying assumption is that societal 
actors are increasingly becoming an inseparable part of formal policy programs.  
 
1.1.3. Regional cooperation and integration 
Similarly, although the conceptual borders of regional cooperation and integration can be 
distinguished quite well, one cannot be analyzed without the other in the context of this 
study. After all, as the classical regional integration theories that emerged in the 1950s 
and 1960s primarily addressed the European case (Hettne & Söderbaum 2006: 182), 
regionalism studies in general became dominated by this rather unique supranational 
model. According to Schmitter (2007: 2), virtually all conceptualizing and theorizing 
about the role of transnational regional organizations has come to be based on the 
European experience alone, which ‘has had the subtle effect of shifting the focus from 
cooperation between consenting and still sovereign national states to the voluntary, 
gradual and fitful process of their integration’. 
One of the most widely accepted definitions of regional integration is that of Lindberg’s 
(cited by Obydenkova 2011), who defines the concept as, firstly, ‘the process whereby 
nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies 
independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the 
decision-making process to new central organs’, and secondly, as ‘the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and 
political activities to a new center’. Thereby, integration can be seen as a more complex 
process, one beyond the limits of cooperation, where such a shift of loyalty does not 
occur. Integration can thus be considered as a process and cooperation as the initial stage 
of this process (Ibid.). 
Whereas regional integration implies some change of sovereignty, or, according to Haas 
(cited by Hettne 2005: 544), aims to explain on which conditions and for which reasons 
states cease to be fully sovereign, definitions of cooperation usually refer to national 
interests or the common good. For example, it has been defined as ‘joint efforts by states 
to solve specific problems’ and as ‘any interstate activity designed to meet the commonly 
acknowledged need’ (Ibid.: 544-545). Schmitter (2007: 4) advances the topic of when 
cooperation becomes integration further. According to him, it is relatively costless to 
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enter into and exit from cooperation arrangements and loyalty to the region as such 
remains minimal. It is only when this regional arrangement acquires a degree of 
legitimacy to act on its own regarding initiating proposals, making decisions and 
implementing policies, is there reason to say that a regionalism project is switching from 
cooperation to integration.  
In the context of this thesis, the digital agenda in the BSR will be referred to as ‘digital 
cooperation’ rather than ‘digital integration’, mainly for the reason that decision-making 
regarding digital matters has not been delegated to any central organs. It is quite the 
opposite – the thesis makes the claim that digital cooperation in the BSR is just beginning 
to emerge through the efforts of various governance networks. As prescribed by the 
concept of cooperation, these networks share a common goal – the benefits of a single 
digital market – but each retain their legitimacy to act on their own. At the same time, it 
has to be borne in mind that BSR digital cooperation is deeply embedded in wider EU 
integration processes, evidenced already by the integrational nature of the aim of attaining 
a digital single market – this, however, will be elaborated on when process-tracing the 
development of digital cooperation in the BSR. 
All in all, the theoretical choices made in this thesis about regionalism can be visualized 
as follows: 
 
Graph 2: Theoretical choices about regionalism 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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1.2. Digitization 
There is no doubt that digitization has transformed the way modern society functions. 
Rapid advances in technology are driving society towards more and more information-
centeredness, which on the one hand poses new globalization challenges, but at the same 
time also provides the tools to tackle them through digital innovation. Broadband 
connectivity, wireless mobility, cloud computing, e-commerce, social media and sensors 
are just a few components of what we now know as digitization (Friedrich et al. 2011: 5).  
Digitization as a process was set in motion in the late 20th century by the third wave of 
invention and economic disruption after two waves of industrial revolutions. The third 
wave was initiated by remarkable advances in computing and ICT technology, most 
notably the development of the integrated circuit. (The Economist 2014: 1) Thus, 
digitization is fuelled by technological developments – ‘the spread of broadband access 
and mobile devices, the continued impact of Moore’s law (cutting the price of computing 
power in half every two years), and increased sophistication in the management and use 
of data’ (Friedrich et al. 2012). 
Digitization as a technical concept can be described as ‘the representation and 
augmentation of our physical world in ones and zeros’, referring to processing 
information in digital instead of analogue form (Press 2014). In a broader societal context 
and more suitably to this thesis, however, digitization is defined as the ‘economic and 
social transformation triggered by the massive adoption of digital technologies to 
generate, process, share and transact information’ (Katz et al. 2014: 32). Even more 
specifically, Friedrich et al. (2011: 5) refer to digitization as: 
…the pervasive adoption of a wide variety of digital, real-time, and networked 
technologies, products, and services that will enable people, companies, governments, and 
even machines to stay connected and communicate with one another, gathering, analyzing, 
and exchanging massive amounts of information on all kinds of activities – and the 
economic and societal impacts those activities will have.  
In essence, digitization is a combination of technological and social innovation. It is based 
on the evolution of network access (mobile or fixed broadband networks) and 
semiconductor technologies (computers, wireless devices), but has a set of social 
spillovers resulting from the use of technology (common platforms for application 
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development, electronic delivery of government services, electronic commerce, social 
networks and availability of online information) (Katz & Koutroumpis 2013: 314). The 
social aspect of digitization is what allows to make connections to regionalism processes 
in this thesis – digital cooperation as driven by technology, but realized and controlled by 
social networks. Technology, after all, has to be implemented and adopted by people in 
order to count as an innovation. 
On a broader level, it follows that digitization, much like the cooperation it drives, has to 
proceed from a clearly perceived need. For the purpose of creating something new and 
valuable with digital technology, two aspects can be seen as underpinning digital 
innovation processes – an understanding of what has become possible thanks to 
technological advances and an insight into some unmet need. The result is what Fichman 
et al. (2014: 330) define as a ‘product, process or business model that is perceived as new, 
requires some significant changes on the part of adopters and is embodied in or enabled 
by IT’. This ‘insight into some unmet need’, in turn, can be easily translated to a regional 
cooperation context whereby actors can attain an underlying ‘common good’ with the 
help of modern ICTs. 
 
1.2.1. Digitization in the private and public sector 
Rapid digitization processes started in the private sector after IBM defined the concept of 
‘e-business’ and soon after, the prefix ‘e’ – suggesting that an activity is electronic or 
digital in nature (Misuraca 2007: 56) – was everywhere. There was e-commerce, e-
finance, e-enterprise, e-economy and e- ‘just about anything else’. (Alter 2010: 16) Both 
in the private and public sector, digitization mainly takes the form of innovation in 
services. The logic of the underlying digital innovation, however, is somewhat different. 
Studying private sector digitization processes, Friedrich et al. (2011: 16) come to the 
conclusion that companies which still deal in physical goods tend to operate in an 
essentially analogue mode, whereas those dealing in information and services (sometimes 
also called ‘information services’, cf. Rust & Lemon 2001) have quickly digitized. 
Leading the digitization race are thus financial services and insurance, computers and 
electronics, and media and telecommunications (Ibid.: 6). The benefits of private sector 
digitization are diverse – from increased resource efficiency and higher productivity 
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owing to automated processes and reduction of man hours (Mpinganjira & Mbango 2013: 
37) to greater customer insight and reach, leading to lower customer service and 
transaction costs (Zoroja 2011: 120). The ultimate aim, of course, is to raise the 
competitiveness of companies in an attempt to set or keep up the pace with others.   
While the private sector took the leading role in digitizing their business processes, the 
public sector – realizing the potential benefits – soon started to make a concerted effort 
in the same direction. There is, however, a clear distinguishing line between private and 
public sector digitization. Namely, while economic motivations commonly dominate 
reasons for adopting e-services in the private sector, digital innovation in the public sector 
is driven by both economic and social benefits. Some of these social benefits include the 
need to promote universal access to government services, increased transparency in 
government dealings and reduced corruption. (Mpinganjira & Mbango 2013: 37) 
In the midst of public sector digital innovations such as e-health, e-procurement, e-
participation, e-justice, e-learning and e-administration, the overarching concept of e-
government is the most widespread. The first e-government initiatives emerged in the late 
1990s and by today, e-government capabilities can vary from ‘the provision of simple 
information via a website to the ability to conduct financial transactions and finally to the 
provision of a level of e-democracy such as e-voting or policy development participation’ 
(Rose & Grant 2010: 26). As the scope of e-government capabilities has been gradually 
extending, the definition of e-government has evolved with it. E-government is no longer 
seen as a simple process of providing information or services via the internet, but as a 
way of transforming how citizens interact with government and how government interacts 
with itself’ (Ibid.).  
Governments mainly have two goals when implementing e-government systems – to 
enhance their service delivery and to minimize their operation costs. At the same time, 
governments are also developing custom-made models in order to better satisfy citizen 
needs and engage various stakeholders, benefitting from product personalization and 
service customization. (Zoroja 2011: 129) On the one hand, thus, governments seek to 
provide services and information in a faster and cheaper manner, and on the other hand, 
they seek to reduce distance between government and citizens through tailored solutions. 
Although the central innovation lies in what may be called ‘single window’ access – 
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opening up a single window for citizens and enterprises through which they can manage 
all their dealings with public bodies and thus save effort (Lenk 2006: 190), e-government 
thus also has a role to play in strengthening democratic processes.  
 
1.2.2. Digital cooperation 
Deliberating the importance of cooperating in today’s digitized world, Richardson (2014) 
claims that the essence of digital cooperation lies in its ability to defy traditional 
hierarchies and institutions in organizing collective work. Instead, digital cooperation 
happens on all levels and is intertwined with decentralization processes which both 
transfer decision-making to lower levels of the public sector as well as creates more 
autonomous units within and beyond government to ‘stimulate initiative, increase local 
responsiveness and provide tailored local solutions’ (Navarra & Cornford 2012: 38) and 
to reduce transaction costs that would otherwise undermine effective public 
administration (Eggertsson 2013: 2). It follows then that if digital cooperation happens in 
all fields and on all levels, the task of capturing its essence becomes increasingly difficult.  
In these lines, Sevaldson (2006: 1) seems to question the whole concept of digital 
cooperation, arguing that it is virtually impossible to find cooperation today that is not 
supported by digital means in the first place. In this sense, digital cooperation with its 
focus on the exchange of information via digital media or infrastructure is indeed not 
fundamentally different from what has been done before. What has to be understood, 
however, is that the emphasis in ‘digital cooperation’ is actually not on ‘digital’, but rather 
‘cooperation’. As Friedrich et al. (2012) indicate, the core of digital cooperation is not 
about innovative technological solutions, but about the way in which people are adapting 
and incorporating new ways of communicating and sharing information. As this 
cooperation now happens in the context of millions and millions of people, our ability to 
cooperate on this kind of scale is fundamentally different after all.  
Of course, the frames or tools for comprehending this cooperation have yet to be 
developed (Richardson 2014), but the importance of doing so becomes obvious in the 
following metaphor, which proves that exponential growth – much like in case of 
digitization – seems negligible until it suddenly develops into something that is already 
unmanageable (The Economist 2014: 3): 
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A man invents a new game, chess, and presents it to his king. The king likes it so much that 
he offers the inventor a reward of his choice. The man asks for one grain of rice for the first 
square of his chessboard, two for the second, four for the third and so on to 64. The king 
readily agrees, believing the request to be surprisingly modest. They start counting out the 
rice, and at first the amounts are tiny. But they keep doubling, and soon the next square 
already requires the output of a large ricefield. Not long afterwards the king has to concede 
defeat: even his vast riches are insufficient to provide a mountain of rice the size of Everest. 
The rationale of trying to systematize digitization processes proceeds directly from this – 
the understanding that ICT progress is now somewhere in the second half of the 
chessboard and some tools need to be developed and applied in order to even begin to 
comprehend the complexity of digitization. Much like in the case of the previous analysis 
of regions, thus, we find that theorizing digitization is hard, while making it also a 
necessity.  
In the context of this thesis, the answer is to give digitization a scope – the BSR – and a 
lens – MLG. This way, the otherwise elusive concepts can be framed in the context of 
one another – although digitization processes were mainly found to refer to digitized 
information (and) services in the private and public sector, these processes have also 
fuelled a new type of cooperation – digital cooperation – which in turn helps to break 
digitization down into a manageable unit of study. 
 
1.3. Multi-level governance 
Underlying MLG as a theoretical lens is a claim that the state no longer dominates over 
domestic preferences and policy-making – it is rather the case that both supranational and 
subnational actors have an increasingly independent role to play. By mobilizing various 
levels of actors, the advantage of MLG lies exactly in its comprehensiveness and 
inclusiveness – compared to neo-functionalism or intergovernmentalism, for instance, the 
MLG perspective allows seeing beyond power games and instead focuses on the 
contribution of various actors towards an end-result. In the following, MLG as a model 
that grew out of the specifics of EU integration will be introduced and coupled with the 
notion of governance networks so to better cater for the specifics of the thesis. In this 
sense, networked MLG is used as a tool for explaining the complex governance 
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mechanism surrounding digital cooperation and identifying the relevant subnational, 
national and supranational actors and the networks they drive. 
 
1.3.1. Government vs governance 
Despite the proliferation of the concept of governance in broader academic literature and 
the general agreement that the nation state increasingly depends on its ability to drive 
efficient cooperation with a range of independent (and interdependent) actors from 
transnational to local levels, there is little agreement on the definitions, scope and what 
actually constitutes governance (Ruhanen et al. 2010: 4). In its widest sense, governance 
has come to mean the decreasing role of leadership, control and hierarchy in governing 
processes, whereas MLG as a model seeks to explain the resulting dynamic interactions 
between various actors that begin to participate in policy-making and implementing.  
Underlying MLG is a conceptual shift from government to governance. Simply put, 
governance is about more than what governments do. It refers to ‘theories and issues of 
social coordination and the nature of all patterns of rule’ and also to ‘practices and 
dilemmas that place less emphasis than did their predecessors on hierarchy and the state’. 
(Bevir 2011 cited by Faludi 2012: 198) The emphasis is thus on various ‘patterns of rule’ 
beyond the state level, though the focus is still on the process of governing. Accounting 
for these ‘other’ levels, Rhodes talks about self-organizing and inter-organizational 
networks and elaborates on the concept of governance as ‘interdependence between 
organizations, continuing interactions between network members, game-like interactions 
rooted in trust and regulated by rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network 
participants, a significant degree of autonomy from the state’ (Ibid.).  
Bringing more clarity to the composition and development reason of the mentioned 
networks, Le Galés (cited by Boman 2005: 13) sees governance as ‘the coordination of 
public and private actors, social groups and institutions in an unstable and fragmented 
environment for the purpose of achieving collectively defined goals’. It can be derived 
from this that although the network of formal and informal actors operate in relative 
incoherence, they can be analyzed as one unit because of their common denominator – 
the wish to attain a shared goal. As such, governance can be defined as ‘the capacity for 
collective action that involves a broad range of actors and institutions as well as informal 
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and formal activities at different administrative levels’ (Scherbenske & Hörnström 2013: 
5). This is very much in line with the previously discussed regionalism principles – 
whereas regionalism suggested that a shared goal between the members of a region is 
what triggers cooperation, governance enables to analyze how this shared goal is pursued 
in the interplay of various regional actors.  
In political science, governance also takes on a specific role of upholding democratic 
values. Here, governance has been defined as the ‘conscious management of regime 
structures with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the public realm’ (Hyden 1991 cited 
by Ruhanen et al. 2010). Legitimacy, once again, is closely connected to the idea of 
gathering various stakeholders around a public concern so to coordinate action and thus 
raise the acceptance of the regime. After all, ‘governance is not something the state does 
to society, but the way society itself, and the individuals who compose it, regulate all the 
different aspects of their collective life’ (Carino 2003: 5). This is not to say that the state 
level loses importance once governance appears – it continues to play a key role in 
enabling and facilitating participation, but operates in the background without 
overwhelming other actors. This way, an environment is shaped where the market and 
civil society can make their own creative and decisive contributions. (Ibid.) 
Summarizing the differences between government and governance, the following 
characteristics can be highlighted: 
 
 
Table 1: Differences between government and governance 
Source: Compiled by the author (based on governance literature) 
 
1.3.1.1. E-government vs e-governance  
The same logic that underpins the ‘governance turn’ can be applied in a digitization 
context for further clarification of the theoretical lens. The most obvious example of this 
is what could be respectively called the ‘e-governance turn’. Although the logic is similar, 
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it just does not seem to be that self-evident yet – for example, Misuraca (2007: 70) 
acknowledges that at the moment, most authors still treat e-governance as a synonym of 
e-government. One instance of this is the definition provided by Savic (2006: 21), who 
refers to e-governance as the ‘process of using information technology for automating 
and improving government operations.’ Based on this approach, one might assume that 
e-governance is merely a combination of ICT and government with changes in the way 
practices are digitized, but not in the governing process itself.  
Another approach that already takes into account changes in the governing process is to 
make a difference by which e-governance is e-government extended to non-state actors. 
Contrary to the governance turn, however, this approach still treats the state as the 
dominant force leading the governing process. For example, it has been said that ‘(e-
governance) establishes a relationship between government officials and citizens’ (Haque 
& Pathrannarakul 2013: 25). However, as e-government already admits to three forms of 
interactions – government-to-government, government-to-business and government-to-
citizen (Ibid.) –, meaning that e-government recognizes only top-down interactions, it 
follows that there must be more behind the differences of e-government and e-
governance.  
The underlying difference lies exactly in the way interactions take place. In case of e-
government, the focus is on service delivery transactions, whereas in case of e-
governance, the focus is on networked participatory interactions (Calista & Melitski 
2007: 87). Underlying this fundamental difference are three changes which translate into 
a number of specific distinctions between the two concepts (Misuraca 2007: 68-72): 
 The growing role of non-state actors, especially transnational corporations 
(TNCs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Increasingly, the state has 
to share its power with these non-state actors.  
 The growing emergence of levels of managing public affairs other than the nation-
state level, in particular the emergence of supra-national levels (EU, global) as 
well as sub-national levels (local, municipal). 
 The growing differentiation of state functions – service delivery, rule-making and 
regulatory. These functions can be increasingly treated as separate from each other 
and are thereby shifted to different levels and different actors. 
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Table 2: Difference between e-government and e-governance 
Source: Adapted from Misuraca 2007: 70-72 
 
The changes that underpin ‘e-governance turn’ are thus very much in line with the general 
‘governance turn’, looking beyond state domination in the interactions of governing 
processes and acknowledging a diverse set of functions and interdependent levels instead 
of one-sided service provision with the help of modern digital technologies. According 
to Calista & Melitski (2007: 93), e-governance is based on a politics perspective that 
‘thrives on a shared interest in digitized communication and decentralized authority. That 
is, digitized and decentralized actors became a conduit for nurturing a networked world, 
which, in turn, elevates e-governance.’ The emphasis is thus not on what the public sector 
can offer to its citizens, but what actors on all levels can do independently to contribute 
to a shared goal.  
 
1.3.2. Underpinnings of MLG 
Favorable grounds for advancing a polycentric theory of policy-making and 
implementation were set in the mid-1970s, when a general discussion emerged on the 
‘overload of government’ and ‘ungovernability of society’ caused by growing 
individualism and the decline of public-spirited values (Torfing and Sorensen 2014: 331). 
As a specific response in EU studies, MLG as a concept emerged – most notably in the 
works of Marks, Hooghe and Blank – during the ‘governance turn’ in the 1980s, growing 
out of criticism for state-centric theories of European integration (Boman 2005: 9).  
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The point of contention between state-centric and polycentric theories like MLG lied in 
the general assumption that the same forces that explained the creation and evolution of 
the EU would also explain its functioning in a given point of time (Piattoni 2009b: 4). 
Contrary to this, MLG argued for a ‘shift away from attempting to explain integration in 
terms of the respective roles of member states and the EU to a concern for explaining how 
the system actually works’ (Jordan 2001 cited by Faludi 2012: 198).1 For this, MLG seeks 
to capture how interactions between various actors interplay in governing processes – 
exactly what the intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists failed to explain (Littoz-
Monnet 2010: 2). In line with the governance turn, thus, MLG as a concept aims to 
accommodate the complex interplay of various actors in collective decision-making and 
implementation. Schmitter (2004 cited by Piattoni 2009b: 2) defines it as: 
‘…an arrangement for making binding decisions that engages a multiplicity of politically 
independent but otherwise interdependent actors – private and public – at different levels 
of territorial aggregation in more-or-less continuous negotiation/deliberation/ 
implementation, and that does not assign exclusive policy competence or assert a stable 
hierarchy of political authority to any of these levels.’ 
Much in line with the new regionalist agenda, MLG points to the fact that state 
sovereignty is becoming diffused across various levels of government – upwards to 
international and transnational organizations; downwards to local governments, public 
service institutions and user boards; and outwards to emerging cross-border regions and 
global city networks (Torfing & Sorensen 2014: 330). According to MLG, the rationale 
of this diffusion of power is that a complex interplay of actors develops around diverse 
problems where the state alone cannot take sole responsibility. The result is a complex 
overlapping process which involves numerous actors that shape the final output according 
to their individual properties – demands, interests, resources and competencies 
(Ganeshalingam 2012). Digitization as a global phenomenon is clearly one of these areas 
where states alone do not have the capacity for efficient policy-making and 
                                                          
1 As Stephenson (2013: 818) summarizes the added value of MLG in a situation where over 40 years of 
‘theoretical ping-pong’ had been going on between intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, ‘it gave 
us a simplified way of understanding what European policy-making looked like on a day-to-day basis in 
policy areas, were we to slice the EU down the middle to obtain a cross-section of governance activity.’ 
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implementation, resulting in regionalization processes whereby societal actors ‘join in’ to 
offer their individual expertise. 
The importance of non-governmental organizations and ad hoc networks are of a 
particular trademark to MLG and shows how groups such as e.g. sub-national 
governments, expert committees, civil society groups and voluntary associations are 
highly relevant actors who are able to exert influence in decision-making and are also 
present in policy implementation, monitoring and evaluation (Berkkan et al. 2009: 32). 
These actors are not nested exclusively within the realm of state preferences, but can act 
independently on both domestic and international arenas, creating transnational links. 
(Boman 2005: 9)  
In relation to state powers, MLG authors do not deny that the state still remains an 
important actor, yet it no longer monopolizes policy-making or the aggregation of 
domestic interests. As such, the state is gradually losing its monopoly on public policy-
making as an increasing number of private stakeholders such as interest organizations, 
NGOs, citizen groups, consultancy firms and businesses become involved in the 
formulation and implementation of public policy. (Torfing & Sorensen 2014: 330) 
Hereby, Torfing and Sorensen (ibid.) warn that we should not talk about a ‘shift from 
government to governance’ as it creates a far too simplistic image and invokes the idea 
of a zero-sum game according to which governance is necessarily expanding at the 
expense of government. In order to avoid the notion of the ‘hollowing out of the state’, 
(multi-level) governance should rather be referred to as a ‘new perspective on an 
emerging reality’. Just as the functions of regions were found to be changing in time, 
fuelling more open policy-making procedures owing to globalization pressures, the same 
can be said about states. 
 
1.3.2.1 MLG criticism 
It is often claimed that MLG is not a theory as such, but rather a method to explain how 
governance can take place at different levels (Berkkan 2009: 12). In the same lines, 
Rosamond (cited by Boman 2005: 10-11) criticizes MLG for its theoretical deficiency, 
calling it rather ‘an organizing metaphor’ than a theory as its main goal is descriptive – 
capturing the complex nature of a MLG system rather than predicting its dynamics.  
31 | P a g e  
 
In the context of this thesis, however, this criticism is not particularly significant – it 
rather complements its purpose. First and foremost, as it was found that digitization is 
exponentially growing and might already be beyond our comprehension, an ‘organizing 
metaphor’ is exactly what is needed. Moreover, MLG is not used in the context of this 
thesis as a testable theory or a ground on which to build predictions, but as an analytical 
tool that helps to frame the governance system of BSR digital cooperation and account 
for the complex interplay of the respective actors. As it was claimed that the field is 
relatively unexplored, the aim is to form a wider perspective of BSR digital cooperation 
rather than to guesstimate how much power each level of actors has in driving BSR digital 
cooperation. In line with the method of process-tracing introduced in the next chapter, 
good description is the basis of understanding the context in which cooperation takes 
place.  
One of the key criticisms of MLG has also been its inconclusiveness in distinguishing 
governance from other descriptions of participation. As the underlying claim is indeed 
the same – that an increase in the number of actors and levels involved in policy-making 
can often be observed – MLG is criticized for not providing enough empirical indicators 
that imply whether we are witnessing governance or participation in a specific context. 
There is a clear dividing line that separates the MLG approach from other discourse on 
increased participation, however – ‘participation refers to engagement in the decision-
making process, while governance infers that engagement involves some influence over 
the outcomes of this process’. (Bache 2008: 31) This indicates that besides increased 
participation in policy formulation, the actors of MLG also have an important role in 
implementing and realizing policies.  
The third ‘set of criticisms’ MLG has been subject to rather concern differing conceptions 
of the world than actual shortcomings of MLG. Namely, some believe that the 
organization of levels implies a hierarchical order which cannot be possible in such a 
complex process. Others completely fail to distinguish between levels since public and 
private actors seem to operate in interlocking roles both domestically and internationally. 
Also, state-centric theories such as realism reject the idea of a supranational level with its 
own authority, considering international organizations as mere tools which are 
established for the sole purpose of serving state interests. (Ganeshalingam 2012) In these 
lines, Bache (cited by Boman 2005: 11) concludes that it is premature to assign much 
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autonomy to other levels because the state still remains a ‘gate keeper’ in the policy-
making processes, allowing other units to participate but not to significantly affect the 
policy outcomes. This criticism, however, does not seem to explain in sufficient detail 
why the fact that states remain gate keepers eliminates the chance that other governance 
levels might have a considerable effect on policy outcomes.  
 
1.3.3. Governance networks 
Despite the fact that MLG offers a suitable organizing metaphor for analyzing digital 
cooperation and the involved actors on various levels, the theoretical lens should also 
enable to say something about the essence of these actors. For this, the thesis also draws 
on a rather new concept most notably advanced by Torfing and Sorensen – that of 
governance networks. As the governance turn can be treated synonymous with the 
proliferation of networks on a scale not witnessed before, the notion of governing through 
networks helps to say who the actors behind a regionalism project are and as such 
complements MLG, which remains the focus as a tool for identifying various levels of 
(networked) actors. 
A network could be understood as ‘a social system in which actors develop comparatively 
durable patterns of interaction and communication aimed at policy problems or policy 
programs’ (Bressers & O’Toole 1998: 218). Combining the concepts of networks and 
governance, Torfing and Sorensen (2014: 342) claim that while the European governance 
debate is still seeking for commonly agreed upon definitions and typologies of 
governance, the research on governance networks has developed into a new political 
science paradigm based on clear concepts, sound theories and a rapidly expanding 
research agenda. The authors add that governance networks, despite the fact that they 
might be unstable and diffuse, deserve scholarly attention because they add considerably 
to the current transformation of the form and functioning of government and because they 
create new spaces of governance by breaking down the traditional dichotomies of state 
and society, public and private, local and global (Torfing & Sorensen 2009: 236). 
Similarly to MLG in general, networked governance occurs in complicated situations that 
span across various administrative boundaries – Huppe and Creech (2012: 1), for 
example, suggest that polycentric arrangements such as networked governance produce 
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beneficial solutions wherever policy problems exceed a certain level of complexity and 
where existing institutions alone cannot manage these problems. Marcussen and Torfing 
(cited by Torfing and Sorensen 2014: 223) similarly claim that governance networks aim 
to respond to ‘complex, conflict-ridden and ill-defined policy problems’ and as such have 
five main characteristics: 
 Network governance is a relatively stable horizontal articulation of 
interdependent, but operationally autonomous actors from the public and/or 
private sector, who 
 interact with one another through ongoing negotiations, which 
 take place within a relative institutionalized framework with regulative, 
normative, cognitive and imaginary elements, 
 facilitate self-regulation in the shadow of hierarchy (a kind of broadened 
autonomy), and 
 contribute to the production of public purpose in the broad sense of public values, 
visions, plans, standards, regulations and concrete decisions.  
Combining these characteristics with the ones advanced by Dumoulin (2013, Table 3), 
we could expect that governance networks appear in a relatively institutionalized setting 
– as will also be demonstrated in case of the BSR – in response to emerging and still ill-
defined policy problems – much like in case of digitization. Thereby, the networks 
steadily move towards solving the mutually perceived policy problem by learning from 
each other’s experience and expertise and finding synergies that lead to multi-level 
cooperation.  
 
 
Table 3: Dimensions of networked governance 
Source: Adapted from Dumoulin 2013 
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Continuing with the work of Torfing and Sorensen (2014: 335), the authors assert that 
governance networks may have a variety of different functions. Whereas some 
governance networks simply aim to contribute to the exchange of knowledge, information 
and ideas in order to facilitate well-informed decision-making, other networks seek to 
coordinate actions so to create complementarities. Even more ambitious governance 
networks might attempt to develop a common understanding of emerging policy 
problems and to formulate and implement joint solutions. Governance networks also have 
different forms as they might be either self-grown from below or initiated from above; 
intra-organizational or inter-organizational; open and loosely connected or closed and 
highly integrated; short-lived or relatively permanent; and sector-specific or society-wide. 
Last but not least, governance networks carry many different labels as they are frequently 
referred to as e.g. think tanks, strategic alliances, task forces, committees and 
commissions. (Ibid.) Governance networks are thus rather fluid in their nature and assume 
a form and function according to the policy problem at hand.   
 
1.4. Theoretical synthesis 
Summing up the principles of the three concepts that will be assumed in the thesis, the 
following aspects should be stressed: 
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Graph 3: Theoretical assumptions of the thesis 
Source: Compiled by the author (based on literature) 
 
Despite appearing like three somewhat distant concepts, regionalism, digitization and 
MLG in their essence share many foundations crucial to the study focus. First and 
foremost, it was found that some frames need to be developed in order to grasp the 
complexity of digitization as a global phenomenon. As nowadays, virtually all 
cooperation is arguably fuelled by the exchange of data via digital media, the concept of 
digital cooperation might be the first step towards understanding these processes. 
Ultimately, as digital cooperation is more about the ‘cooperation’ as a collective action 
towards a common goal than the ‘digital’ (technologies), it can be said that although ICTs 
as a passive component drive digital cooperation, it is essentially realized by social 
networks as the active component. This, in turn, is related to the other two concepts that 
underpin collective action through networked arrangements. 
Firstly, new regionalism provides a suitable framework for systematizing digital 
cooperation because of its commitment to globalization processes. The underlying 
assumption is that regional digital cooperation networks emerge in response to the need 
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of reacting to the pressures of globalization through local (in this sense regional) means, 
especially in areas where state alone cannot cope – digitization, as concluded, is definitely 
one of these areas, demanding for more extroverted policy-making. These emerging 
‘arrangements’ and the patterned interactions between them, in turn, change the weights 
that various governance levels have both in upward and downward directions. The 
networks that are therefore behind a regional project to the likes of the BSR turn the 
region into an active subject with a complex interplay of actors on various levels, all 
working towards a similar end goal through their own interests, needs and agendas.  
Secondly, whereas new regionalism looks beyond the state level, the concept of MLG 
helps to explore how the interplay of the underlying actors looks like. In line with the 
assumption that the nation state increasingly depends on its ability to drive efficient 
cooperation with other actors as society has become more and more ‘ungovernable’, it 
follows that the actor levels and their contribution to the wider public good have to be 
explored in order to begin to comprehend how modern information societies are being 
collectively constructed. As such, governance is fundamentally multi-level and 
networked, whereas the state role has not been hollowed out – it is rather the case that 
states are metagoverning networks, thus exercising power in new ways. 
 
Graph 4: Theoretical framework of the thesis 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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Proceeding from the main principles of the concepts and their interconnections, we might 
assume that digital cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region has the following characteristics: 
 In pursuing digital cooperation on the regional level, aspects regarding 
geographical proximity are downplayed compared to the benefits of treating the 
region as a political project; 
 An increasing number of digital cooperation networks on all levels of governance 
are observable in the region with the main aim of developing mutual relations and 
sharing experience; 
 The observable digital cooperation networks are flexible, task-specific and need-
based, while contributing to a mutually perceived common good; 
 The governance system of digital cooperation is fragmented with no clear-cut 
interconnections and no central actors or decision-making; 
 The role of states is to facilitate cooperation and act as a cooperation partner, 
diffusing power to both supra- as well as sub-national actors in a process of 
decentralization; 
 Digital cooperation in the region is mainly focused on exchanging information 
with the help of using modern ICTs and overcoming the related cross-border 
barriers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
Methodological framework 
 
In the first chapter, the main points of departure of this thesis were introduced. It was 
clarified that the thesis takes a new regionalist perspective, which is in essence very much 
intertwined with the theoretical focus of MLG, stressing the importance of looking 
beyond state domination and accounting for various actor networks who contribute to 
regionalism projects. Also, the processes of digitization were described and a conclusion 
was reached that digital cooperation as a regional response to globalization pressures is a 
suitable context in which to systematize digitization. These principles lead up to the 
second chapter, which introduces the methodological framework of the thesis along with 
justifying the BSR as its unit of analysis.  
 
2.1. BSR as the unit of analysis 
The BSR is typically identified through a political concept of macro-regionalism that has 
very strong connections to EU policy-making. As such, the region is usually seen to 
consist of three Nordic countries – Finland, Sweden and Denmark – the three Baltic 
countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – as well as Germany and Poland. In the 
following, the main features of the BSR as a political macro-region will be elaborated on, 
explaining the importance of the region as a unit of analysis in the field of digital 
cooperation. For this, the same three concepts – regionalism, digitization and governance 
– will be used, revealing that the BSR countries are digitally more advanced than the EU 
average and cooperation in the region is mainly fuelled by its institutional set-up and 
embeddedness in wider EU governance.  
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2.1.1. BSR as a macro-region 
Macro-regions, macro-regionalism and macro-regional cooperation are relatively new 
political concepts – the launch of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) 
in 2009 can be seen as the first ’experiment’ with macro-regionalism. The strategy was 
created so to bring Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Poland and 
Germany together in a so-called ‘macro-region’, which was not initially even explained 
as a concept. The Commission formally defined and applied the concept of macro-region 
in the position paper ‘Macro-regional strategies in the European Union’. According to 
this paper, a macro-region is ‘an area including territory from a number of different 
countries or regions associated with one or more common features or challenges.’ Despite 
this rather broad definition, it is now clear that macro-regional cooperation represents a 
new type of EU policy that is not directly comparable to any of the existing forms of 
cooperation of the Union. (Berkkan et al. 2009: 4) 
The idea for a strategy for the BSR emerged already during the first decade of the 21st 
century. At first, the idea was primarily lobbied by Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Germany 
and, more interestingly, Great Britain, demanding for enhanced cooperation between EU 
institutions and regional cooperation forms. (North 2012: 12) The initiative was even 
more actively advanced by Sweden from 2007 and, after two years, an Action Plan was 
concluded, which in turn reached the implementation stage in 2010 (Kristensen 2011: 
147). As the countries in the region share many common resources and demonstrate 
considerable interdependence, the main objectives of the strategy were formulated as 
follows: promoting a sustainable environment, enhancing the region’s prosperity, 
increasing accessibility and attractiveness as well as ensuring safety and security (Report 
from the Commission… 2011: 1). The focus areas were combined into one coherent 
strategy and the whole region effectively became a model where new ideas could be tested 
and problems tackled or solved on the level of a region.  
With the Eastern enlargement, the Baltic Sea in essence became an EU internal sea. 
Although a relatively high level of homogeneity between the countries could be observed 
in economic, environmental and cultural terms before, the fact that the region became 
more unified in its institutional setting also provided the opportunity to tackle mutual 
problem areas more effectively and bindingly, while bringing together stakeholders from 
various levels. It can be thus said that the BSR macro-regional project under the EUSBSR 
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is a ‘litmus test’ for a new mode of governance, that is expected to ‘… practically 
implement the objective of territorial cohesion introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and bring 
about concrete improvements in a series of policy areas’. Even more, the strategy signals 
that a new level of policy-making is emerging in the EU, located between the nation state 
and the supranational community. (Schymik 2011: 5) For all of these reasons, the BSR is 
an important case to study in shaping an understanding of where governance and 
cooperation in the EU is heading.  
 
2.1.2. Digitization in the BSR 
Although the concept of digitization has already developed over decades, it is still 
surrounded by a lack of standard performance indicators to measure the extent to which 
ICT is rooted in societies. As one approach, the EU has developed a Smart Europe sub-
index which also includes the Digital Agenda pillar. The aim of the sub-index is to 
measure the extent to which European countries are driving economies that are based on 
knowledge and innovation, whereas its digital pillar measures the extent to which the 
economies have harnessed ICT to share knowledge and enhance the productivity of their 
industries2 (The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report… 2012). 
Based on the 2012 report (Table 4, left), it can be seen that the BSR (EU members) is on 
the average performing better at digitization than the rest of the EU. As many as five BSR 
countries are positioned in the top ten, whereas only the UK (ranking 1st) and the 
Netherlands (ranking 3rd) interfere in the top seven as non-BSR countries. The Nordic 
countries are without doubt the European frontrunners in digitization, whereas Estonia is 
the biggest ‘outlier’ among Eastern European countries. Based on competitiveness 
patterns, the report even goes as far as placing Estonia among Western Europe in an 
attempt to define the ‘four Europes’ of competitiveness3. Lithuania, Latvia and Poland 
are currently performing below EU average.  
                                                          
2 The digital pillar consists of indicators such as government prioritization of ICT, internet users, extent of 
business internet use, ICT access for all basic services, e-participation index, ICT and business model 
creation (The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report… 2012). 
3 Including besides the digital dimension also enterprise environment, innovativeness, education, labor 
market, social inclusion and environmental stability (Ibid.). 
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Besides this digital sub-index, the Commission has recently also developed a new index 
specifically meant to measure digital progress in European countries – the Digital 
Economy and Society Index (DESI). The composite index of 30 indicators includes 
aspects regarding connectivity (how widespread, fast and affordable broadband is), 
human capital (internet skills), use of internet (from news to shopping), integration of 
digital technology (e.g. e-invoices, cloud services and e-commerce) and digital public 
services (e.g. e-government and e-health). (European Commission 2015) 
According to these most recent results regarding digitization (Table 4, right), the ranking 
is somewhat different than the analyzed digital pillar. The Nordic countries are once again 
among the most digitized economies with Denmark and Sweden occupying the top two 
positions. The top seven also includes the Netherlands (3rd) and the UK (6th) among non-
BSR countries, this time also accompanied by Belgium (5th). The overall pattern is 
similar, however – the Nordics and Estonia raising the BSR score, Germany and Lithuania 
among the average performers and Latvia and Poland somewhat lagging behind. In sum 
of these two indices, it nevertheless becomes clear why the BSR deserves special attention 
as the unit of study in the digitization context – the region includes one of the top 
performers in the EU, but on the average also performs better than the EU, indicating the 
leading role of the region in driving EU digitization processes.  
 
Table 4: Smart Europe digital pillar 2012 (left) and DESI 2015 (right) in the BSR 
Source: European Commission 
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2.1.3. Governance in the BSR 
The governing system of the BSR as we know it today – characterized by a complex 
network of subnational, national, international, supranational and transnational actors – 
is first and foremost the result of events which were set in motion in the 90’s. Or as Behr 
and Jokela (2011: 1-6) claim, the ‘seemingly unstoppable growth of regional 
organizations since the end of the Cold War has been one of the defining characteristics 
of the current international system’. This is especially true for the BSR, when keeping in 
mind the wealth of cooperation formats that emerged during the period, e.g. international 
regimes like the Helsinki Convention, transnational networks like the Union of the Baltic 
Cities, transnational policy networks like the Baltic 21 and intergovernmental institutions 
like the Council of the Baltic Sea States. These regionalism processes signaled a new type 
of governance whereby increasing importance was assigned to levels below, above and 
beside the nation state.  
At the same time, BSR governance has become increasingly embedded in the wider 
system of EU governance (Kern & Gänzle 2013: 10). After all, the 2004 enlargement 
effectively left the Baltic Sea surrounded by EU member states with the exception of 
Russia and, depending of the definitions of the BSR scope in general, Norway. Fuelled 
by the opportunities that the more solidly institutionalized setting of the EU can offer to 
solving common regional problems more effectively, a fundamental change in the 
governing system of the BSR began to take place (Kern, Löffelsend 2004: 1), raising talks 
of transferring BSR decision-making to a sphere between the state and supranational 
level. Kern (2011: 27) ascribes the root of these ‘Europeanization’ processes in the BSR 
both to economic and political factors. Most importantly, as the EU candidate countries 
were put under a lot of pressure to comply with the acquis communautaire in a process 
of ‘governance by conditionality’ in the pre-accession phase, the (by now) member states 
already came to prioritize EU policies on the regional level as well. Thus, promoting 
economic interdependence and political stability in the BSR as basic strategic objectives 
has added a decidedly European dimension to BSR governance (Scott 2003: 137). 
The first steps towards this increased presence of the EU in BSR governance were already 
taken in the mid-90’s, when the accession of Sweden and Finland gave the EU an 
extensive role in the region. The next great EU milestone came a few years later – in 
1999, the Northern Dimension was launched, indicating a special emphasis on Russia, 
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Norway and Iceland as EU’s northern neighbours and presenting a number of ‘soft 
targets’ in e.g. cross-border cooperation and environmental policy. Not less important is 
the role of various regional EU policy instruments for projects under e.g. Interreg that 
promote extensive networking in the BSR (Kern, Löffelsend 2004: 26-27). The 
involvement of the EU in various regional initiatives such as HELCOM, Baltic 21 and 
the Council of the Baltic Sea States has solidified EU’s presence even further. These are 
just a few examples indicating the ever-increasing influence of the EU in the BSR. 
However, by far the strongest indication of EU governance in the BSR emerged with the 
analytical concept of macro-regionalism and the subsequent adoption of the EUSBSR. It 
is said that the emergence of macro-regions indicated a new governance in the EU – one 
that on the wider level preserves common assets (e.g. the euro), but one that develops 
regional powerhouses like the BSR under principles of subsidiarity (Stahl 2009). As 
Berkkan et al. (2009: 44) claim, ‘the involvement of the EU in the EUSBSR signified a 
strong hands-on approach in the governance of the region’, which had the rationale of 
both simplifying and making the architectural structures more efficient as well as to make 
EU more relevant for the citizens, businesses and organizations of the BSR.4 As such, we 
might expect that besides its pre-institutionalized setting where governance networks 
could flourish, digital cooperation in the BSR is very much influenced by its 
embeddedness in wider EU governance.  
 
2.2. Research methods and questions 
The thesis assumes case study research as its main method. The appropriateness of case 
study research in the context of this thesis is expressed by Yin’s (2009: 14 cited by Willis 
2014) explanation of the method as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomena and context are not clearly evident’. As such, the method 
complements the purpose of the thesis as it enables to develop a ‘thick description’ 
(Geertz 1973, ibid.) of digital cooperation as a complex phenomenon in an actual setting 
– the Baltic Sea Region. As digital cooperation was found to be rather under-studied in 
                                                          
4 Thereby, Marcinkute (2013) stresses that an effective MLG is key to the success of the EUSBSR. The aim 
is to establish a deepened dialogue between actors at all levels of governance in the BSR on how to jointly 
tackle future problems and challenges. 
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regionalism literature, the method enables to give a holistic account of the study focus by 
developing a versatile narrative around it.  
Case studies are often criticized in the lines of subjectivity and generalizability5. These 
‘risks’ surrounding case study research will be mitigated in a number of ways. To start 
with, the thesis seeks to combine both theoretical and practical knowledge – the 
assumptions that were developed based on the theoretical synthesis will be reviewed in 
light of empirical data and conclusions on the emerging governance model of BSR digital 
cooperation will be drawn. In fact, case studies can be seen to have a specific 
methodological rigor as they ‘‘close in’ on real-life situations and test views directly in 
relation to phenomena as they unfold in practice’ (Flyvberg 2006: 19). For developing an 
even more versatile narrative and diminishing the methodological critique of case study 
research, complementary methods like process-tracing and interviewing are also 
employed.  
Also, it is said that a strategic choice of cases is necessary for avoiding generalization 
issues (Ibid.: 13). In this sense, the five levels and examples of governance serve as a 
‘strategic choice’ in that they provide various perspectives of the same central case, thus 
increasing the reliability of the results. The lessons learned in the context of one 
regionalism project, in turn, can both complement and compete with other regionalism 
cases, e.g. other EU macro-regions (the Danube Region, the Adriatic Ionian Region, the 
Alpine Region). Last but not least, Flyvberg (2006: 21) defends the case study method by 
saying that a hard-to-summarize narrative is not a problem to case study researchers as it 
is a sign that ‘the study has uncovered a particularly rich problematic’. The goal is then 
to allow the study to mean different things to different people, not summarize the 
complexity in statements that fall on the general side.  
All in all, the thesis aims to answer three principal questions so to draw a ‘bigger picture’ 
of BSR digital cooperation as the case study: 
                                                          
5 The main criticism is well summarized by Flyvberg (2006: 1), who claims that there are five common 
misunderstandings about case study research: (i) theoretical knowledge is more valuable than practical 
knowledge; (ii) one cannot generalize from a single case, therefore the single case study cannot contribute 
to scientific development; (iii) the case study is most useful for generating hypotheses, while other 
methods are more suitable for hypotheses testing and theory building; (iv) the case study contains bias 
toward verification; and (v) it is often difficult to summarize specific case studies. 
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1. How has digital cooperation developed in the BSR regional context? 
2. How is MLG expressed in today’s BSR digital cooperation? 
3. What form of digital cooperation do we have in the BSR? 
The first question implies looking back in time, identifying the major milestones that 
together conditioned the current situation whereby cooperation networks have emerged 
on various levels to collectively construct BSR digital governance. For this purpose, the 
process-tracing method is used as a tool to identify and account for the various events in 
time that, in combination, ‘produced’ digital cooperation in the BSR. The knowledge 
gained from this method will serve as an introduction into understanding why we are 
witnessing the kind of digital cooperation in the BSR as we are currently witnessing.  
The second and third question account for BSR digital cooperation as it is today – 
governed by cooperation networks in an emerging governance model as assumed in the 
theoretical section. Through desk research and expert interviews, several of these 
cooperation networks are mapped and analyzed. This results in observable patterns of 
BSR digital cooperation that will be coupled with the theoretical assumptions to form a 
wider understanding of BSR digital cooperation together with its main actors, obstacles 
and enablers. All in all, the design of the empirical part of this thesis along with the main 
methods and research questions can be visualized as follows:  
 
Graph 5: Methodological framework of the thesis 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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2.2.1. Phase 1 – process-tracing 
In the first phase of the methodological approach, the events triggering BSR digital 
cooperation are process-traced. This method is suitable for the purpose of analyzing the 
development of digital cooperation in the BSR as it enables to look at causal relationships 
in specific cases, thus shedding light on the factors that conditioned the outcome, i.e. the 
current situation where digital cooperation networks can be observed on various levels of 
governance in the BSR.  
Widely used by authors like Jacobs, Elman, Bennet, Hall, Checkel, George and Lehtonen, 
process-tracing (PT) in political science is often understood as an ambition to trace causal 
mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen 2011: 4). Collier (2011: 823-824), for instance, defines 
PT as the ‘systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light 
of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator’, elaborating that the 
diagnostic pieces of evidence are often understood as part of a temporal sequence of 
events or phenomena. The keywords are thus diagnostic evidence and the temporal 
sequence of events. The central question to ask when applying the method is the following 
(A User’s Guide… 2011): 
How does X produce a series of conditions that come together in some way (or do 
not) to produce Y? 
By stressing the causal process that leads to certain outcomes, thus, the value of PT lies 
in validating theoretical predictions and hypotheses. Looking at a series of sources that 
pertain to a case in terms of the sequence and structure of events can thereby serve as 
evidence that a proposed theoretical hypothesis is indeed evident and observable. (Ibid.) 
Collier (2011: 824) categorizes the power of PT in providing answers to diverse research 
objectives: 
 Identifying novel political and social phenomena and systematically 
describing them; 
 Evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering new hypotheses and 
assessing these new causal claims; 
 Gaining insight into causal mechanisms. 
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According to Bennet and Checkel (2012: 23), a key step in process-tracing is to develop 
case-specific observable implications of the theories in question as theories are rarely 
specific enough to offer tight predictions on the observable implications that should be 
evident in a particular case. As it was found in justifying the case selection that BSR 
cooperation is first and foremost characterized by a pre-institutionalized setting and a 
deep embeddedness in EU governance, these are treated as the ‘deciding factors’ in the 
emergence of the digital cooperation networks. As such, the main source of evidence for 
completing the process-tracing are EU and BSR-level strategic documents that are desk-
researched. EU governance and BSR institutionalization are thereby translated into two 
main strategies – the EU 2020 Agenda and the EUSBSR, respectively. Changes in these 
documents will be accounted for in order to test whether these two aspects might explain 
the case.  
 
2.2.2. Phase 2 – mapping and interviewing 
The second phase aims to account for the dynamics of BSR digital cooperation as it is 
today. Suitably for evaluating theoretical assumptions (much like the ones presented in 
the theoretical synthesis) about governance networks in a real-life context, Huppe and 
Creech (2012: 25) propose a simple three-step approach that allows to characterize 
network governance systems, thus serving as an important point of departure in second 
phase of the methodology: 
1. Identify stakeholders 
2. Differentiate between and categorize stakeholders 
3. Investigate relationships between stakeholders 
To start with, evidence that digital cooperation is indeed pursued in the BSR on various 
levels of MLG is gathered through desk research. Regional networks addressing digital 
cooperation are identified and categorized on five levels of MLG – regional, 
intergovernmental, national, sub-national and the civil society level – and analyzed as 
various perspectives of the case study. Each governance level is thereby represented by 
one network, amounting to five perspectives which are explored through expert 
interviews. As such, the aim is demonstrate practical examples of digital governance 
networks ‘in action’ while contributing to the overall goal of forming an understanding 
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of the essence of BSR digital cooperation and the interactions of the involved MLG 
actors.  
The main condition for choosing the governance networks was that the initiatives should 
all have the underlying aim of promoting BSR digital cooperation. After identifying and 
categorizing the networks, the representatives of each of the networks were contacted for 
conducting interviews. Altogether, seven representatives agreed to share their specific 
experience and general thoughts on BSR digital cooperation in expert interviews. The 
interviews were semi-structured in form, meaning that a list of questions were used as the 
‘guide’ (see Appendix 2), but relevant topics that came up during discussion were also 
elaborated on. This is especially important in the context of case studies, which should 
account for a variety of perspectives and aspects that the researcher might not foresee.  
A summary of the digital cooperation networks, their categories and respective contact 
persons who were interviewed is presented in the following.  
 
Table 5: BSR digital cooperation networks 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
Two of the networks have developed through projects – both Digital Baltic, which focuses 
on open data and public sector information, as well as BSR TaxI, which focuses on the 
exchange of tax information, are cooperation projects funded under regional EU 
instruments. The other networks have a slightly different dynamic. X-Road Europe is 
treated as a network because of its emerging cross-border dimension that seeks to 
implement the X-Road data exchange platform developed in Estonia in nearby countries, 
most notably the Nordics. The NB8 is an intergovernmental cooperation network 
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connecting the Nordic-Baltic countries and recently, a digital dimension was introduced 
in their agenda. Finally, Top of Digital Europe is a brand new regional think-tank growing 
out of the BDF (Baltic Development Forum) network that promotes the image of the BSR 
as an ICT frontrunner. In one way or another, thus, all the networks contribute to the 
common goal of advancing BSR digital cooperation.6 
Besides the networks that were chosen as the case studies to be mapped in more detail, 
there are many digital networks that deserve mentioning, but which do not qualify in the 
context of this study as they (i) do not have a BSR scope and/or (ii) have been 
discontinued as a network. These honorable mentions include projects like BALLAD7 
(Baltic Living Labs), Innovative Nordic Digital Solutions8, e-SENS9 (Electronic Simple 
European Networked Services), OUP10 (Opening Up) and eCitizen II11 (Toward citizen-
centered e-Government in European cities and regions).
                                                          
6 An in-depth overview of the networks is presented in Appendix 1 and the mapping results in Appendix 
3.  
7 A project under the Central Baltic Program that lasted from 2010 to 2012. In line with the priority 
‘economically competitive and innovative region’, the project aimed at promoting a single market for 
digital broadband-based services by creating a living labs network. Led by partners from Sweden, Finland, 
Estonia and Latvia, the objective of the project was to provide support to SMEs in the field of digital 
services, enabling them to adapt their products to local variations. (Central Baltic 2010) 
8 Innovative Nordic Digital Solutions – a project under the Nordic Lighthouse Projects 2014-2017 that is 
still under development. The project aims to remove barriers to a common Nordic digital market and 
supports the development of new and innovative solutions that can be applied in the Nordic countries. 
The idea is to strengthen the Nordic region as a digital frontrunner and prepare for a digital single market 
in Europe. (Norden 2014) 
9 A pan-European project funded under the ICT Policy Support Program of the Competitiveness and 
Innovation Framework. Running from 2013-2016, the objective of the project is to facilitate the access of 
citizens and businesses to public services across borders. The keywords include online public 
administration, interoperability of national systems and re-usable solutions for e-services. From the BSR, 
Denmark, Germany, Poland, Sweden and Estonia are involved in the project. (e-SENS 2015) 
10 A project under the North Sea Region Program that lasted from 2011-2014. The objective was to help 
governments and companies to develop innovative services through the use of open data and to 
encourage a smart use of social media. As part of the project, a network of practitioners was established 
to boost the integration of social media in government-citizen, government-business and government-
government relations. The project involved partners from the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, 
Denmark and UK. (Opening Up 2011) 
11 A project under the Interreg IV C program that lasted from 2010-2013. The aim of the project was to 
support European cities and regions in their e-Government efforts through exploiting established 
networks, sharing experiences and good practices to improve interaction between citizens and public 
authorities and better involving citizens in local decision-making. From the BSR countries, the project 
included Finland, Estonia and Denmark. (the Baltic Institute of Finland 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
The development of BSR digital cooperation 
 
Process-tracing the development of BSR digital cooperation revealed that there are two 
dimensions to be analyzed which, in combination, provided a suitable setting for digital 
cooperation networks to emerge in the region. On the one hand is the strategic dimension. 
Avoiding any longer excursions to the development processes of e.g. the macro-regional 
policy and the Cohesion Policy, it can be simplified that the strategic conditions for digital 
cooperation to appear were fulfilled by the EUSBSR, which reinforced the image and 
institutional setting of the BSR as a unified region, and the Europe 2020 Strategy, which 
laid down the ultimate goals of digital growth, including the development of the digital 
single market. On the other hand, the strategic level is complemented by an operational 
level, which mainly lies in providing financial incentives for networks to emerge in 
response to the challenges set down in strategic documents. This condition is mainly 
fulfilled by the agenda of European Territorial Cooperation funded by the European 
Regional Development Fund.  
 
Graph 6: Conditions for the emergence of BSR digital cooperation 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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3.1. Stage I: EUSBSR as the first indication 
In the first phase, the BSR received a more institutional setting through formalizing the 
EUSBSR and was thus ‘empowered’ as a regionalism project. Though no direct 
commitment is yet made to the digital dimension of regional cooperation, the first 
indication can be seen in one of the priority actions (PA) of the Strategy’s Action Plan – 
‘To remove hindrances to the internal market in the Baltic Sea Region including to 
improve cooperation in the customs and tax area’ – which is coordinated by Estonia (SEC 
2009a: 25). The main argument is that BSR markets are relatively small and therefore 
dependent on regional trade in keeping up their competitiveness, but several obstacles 
still exist in trading goods and services in the BSR. This signals the need for measures 
that would reduce administrative barriers to trade and the constraints that borders impose 
on intensifying cooperation, thus having a clear integrational goal. As the Action Plan 
itself says, ‘better integration is needed if the region is to maintain and improve its 
position as a prosperous region’. Besides trade, the PA sets it as a priority to strengthen 
cross-border tax cooperation in an attempt to combat tax fraud and evasion. One of the 
main obstacles is claimed to be the legal framework of the single market that is not yet 
functioning as well as it should. (Ibid.: 26) 
As a response to these aims, several strategic actions are proposed in the Action Plan. 
One of them – having a more digital nature – is ‘Remove remaining barriers to the cross-
border provision of services’, which prescribes the BSR countries to put in place a variety 
of practical measures such as Points of Single Contact for service providers, electronic 
procedures and administrative cooperation (Ibid.: 27). One of the flagship projects, 
‘Increase the use of electronic signatures/e-identification’, is a good example of an 
emerging digital agenda. The aim of this flagship is to work towards the cross-border 
interoperability of electronic signatures and authentication applications. (Ibid.: 28) 
It is emphasized, however, that all cooperation on the internal market issues are on a 
voluntary basis and no new structures will be imposed as a result of the strategy. It is 
rather the case that regional actors in the BSR have to prove that such cooperation is 
possible, after which this experience can be shared with other Member States. The 
conclusion is that ‘joint projects should be developed within the field of information 
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society.’ (Ibid.) This gives the first indication of how digital cooperation could look like 
in the region – governed by networks that undertake joint projects on voluntary and need-
based grounds and demonstrate success stories on various levels without necessitating 
any new structures, i.e. states-led institutions.  
 
3.2. Stage II: EU-level priorities in the Digital Agenda 
As the second strategic landmark, the Europe 2020 Strategy was proposed by the 
Commission in 2010. With the Strategy, three mutually reinforcing priorities were set – 
smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Under the smart growth priority, knowledge and 
innovation are addressed as the drivers of future growth, while it is stated that ‘this 
requires improving the quality of our education, strengthening our research performance, 
promoting innovation and knowledge transfer throughout the Union, making full use of 
information and communication technologies and ensuring that innovative ideas can be 
turned into new products that create growth, quality jobs and help address European and 
global societal challenges12.’ (COM 2010: 11)  
As one measure devised to tackle these challenges and boost Europe’s digital growth, the 
Strategy introduces a flagship initiative called ‘A Digital Agenda for Europe’ (DAE), 
which foresees the following responsibilities for the EU in general and the member states 
in specific (Ibid.): 
 On the EU level, the Commission will work to e.g. provide a stable legal 
framework, to develop an efficient spectrum policy and to facilitate the use of the 
EU’s structural funds in pursuit of this agenda; 
 On the national level, member states will need to e.g. promote the deployment and 
usage of modern accessible online services (incl. e-government, online health, 
smart home, digital skills and security). 
                                                          
12 In relation to the digital society aspect, it is concluded that ‘the global demand for information and 
communication technologies is a market worth € 2,000 billion, but only one quarter of this comes from 
European firms. Europe is also falling behind on high-speed internet, which affects its ability to innovate, 
including in rural areas, as well as on the on-line dissemination of knowledge and on-line distribution of 
goods and services’. (COM 2010: 11) 
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The described EU level once again stresses the importance of two main factors driving 
the digital agenda – an effective strategic framework on the one hand and sufficient 
financial means to motivate and mobilize actors on the other. On the national level, states 
are expected to facilitate the adoption of new ICT-based services and this effort, as 
claimed, is progressively moving towards levels beyond the state to sub- and 
supranational actors who are increasingly driving cross-border/regional cooperation.  
This major milestone in fuelling digital cooperation in the BSR thereby underpins the role 
of the state as a ‘gate keeper’ between supra- and sub-national actors. In case of DAE, 
more specifically, the EU has prescribed the overall digital agenda to be pursued and 
provides the funds to realize it, whereas the member states promote this agenda to 
encourage practical responses on the sub-national level. This pattern, however, neglects 
the governance level between the EU and the member states which is in the focus of this 
thesis – it is the macro-regional level, which brings us back to the understanding that 
digitization processes are too complex and of lesser use for nation states to pursue 
separately. As such, the BSR has developed its own response to and accommodated the 
principles of DAE. 
 
3.3. Stage III: A revised EUSBSR Action Plan 
In the third phase, thus, it can be observed that the Europe 2020 Strategy along with its 
digital single market agenda received a regional response in the form of a revised 
EUSBSR Action Plan. As the Action Plan itself stresses, ‘the EUSBSR needs to be placed 
firmly within the Europe 2020 agenda and current EU policy developments’ (SEC 2009b: 
39). Even more specifically (ibid.: 41): 
As front-runners in many areas of the digital economy, the region has much to gain from 
the ‘Digital Agenda for Europe’ flagship initiative of the Europe 2020 Strategy and the 
measures of Single Market Act to create growth and jobs in Europe. The region has the 
potential to achieve practical results by identifying and removing barriers to a growing 
digital economy /…/. Any attempts to unlock the growth and innovation potential of digital 
services and content must be supported and enabled by fast reliable communications 
networks which are the prerequisite for digitally driven growth.  
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Having specified the three overall objectives for the EUSBR – ‘Save the Sea’, ‘Connect 
the Region’ and ‘Increase Prosperity’ in a Communication from 201213, the revised 
Action Plan thus now explicitly states that ‘to increase the prosperity of the BSR, the 
EUSBSR includes actions to promote entrepreneurship, innovation, trade and digitally 
driven growth’ (ibid.: 37). Under the previously mentioned priority action ‘Removing 
hindrances to the internal market’, there is now an obvious commitment to the digital 
agenda – a sub-objective ‘Interoperability of cross-border e-services within the Baltic Sea 
region’ has been added with the respective target ‘Active usage of cross-border e-services 
applications in all 8 BSR countries’. Under the sub-objective, a flagship project ‘Cross-
border e-services in the BSR’ was announced. Thereby, the project stresses the ‘need for 
bilateral discussion between neighboring Member States to select priority areas where 
cross-border services give the most value, based on their current socio-economic situation 
and ongoing relations between countries’. (ibid.: 106-108)  
Three main points can be extracted from this: 
 The EU 2020 Strategy and the priorities it prescribes are central in increasing the 
competitiveness and growth of the BSR; 
 The BSR should facilitate practical results in removing barriers to the regional 
single market and in diminishing the digital divide, thus serving as a role model 
on the EU level; 
 Achieving this end-goal starts from bilateral discussions with neighboring 
countries and identifying common areas where deeper cooperation could be 
pursued. As a further step, thus, the emergence of wider networks covering more 
actors and BSR countries can be anticipated.  
The revised Action Plan that now accommodates the EU-level digital agenda can thus be 
seen as a response mechanism – a way of reacting to the ‘the pressures of economic 
globalization’14 through local means. The regional response – promoting cross-border 
cooperation – thereby forms a governance arrangement that is relatively costless to enter 
and exit. However, the wider aim – the digital single market – suggests a gradual and 
                                                          
13 Available at 
[http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/communic/baltic/com_baltic_2012_en.p
df].  
14 The need to develop a single market for maintaining the competitiveness of Europe in general. 
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voluntary integration. Whether or not this will lead to a new center of decision-making 
remains to be seen. All in all, the strategic dimension conditioning digital cooperation in 
the BSR can be summarized as follows:  
 
Graph 7: Development of digital cooperation in the BSR on the strategic level 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
3.4. Financial support for BSR digital cooperation 
As the second dimension conditioning BSR digital cooperation, it is claimed that the 
governance networks have to a large extent developed because of financial incentives 
provided by EU instruments. This is very much in line with regionalism literature, 
whereby it was found that regionalism as a formal political program provides funds for 
informal regionalization processes to occur. In terms of governance literature, these 
resources can be said to promote ‘creative contributions’ of various governance levels to 
problems that states alone cannot manage. As such, the general pattern seems to be one 
where strategic aims are set on higher levels of governance and the lower levels of 
governance – most importantly sub-national and civil society actors – have the role of 
realizing these aims through their individual contributions. In case of the BSR 
specifically, three financial mechanisms can be outlined that greatly affect the 
development of digital cooperation networks in the BSR15:  
                                                          
15 As also evidenced by two of the explored networks – BSR TaxI and Digital Baltic. The other networks 
have a different funding logic – both the NB8 and X-Road initiatives are state-supported and ToDE has a 
corporate sponsor in the example of Microsoft. 
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 Interreg Baltic Sea Region – a transnational cooperation program that funds 
initiatives with partners from the Baltic countries, the Nordic countries (Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark as well as Norway), Germany, Poland, Belarus and/or Russia. 
The program involves funding from two sources – the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) for EU member state participation and the European 
Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) for Belarus and Russia. 
Norway has committed to covering its own costs. The general aim is to ‘strengthen 
the development towards a sustainable, competitive and territorially integrated 
BSR by connecting potentials across borders’. (Inforegio 2011a) 
 Interreg Central Baltic – a cross-border cooperation program that covers 
partners from Estonia, Latvia, Finland and Sweden. The program aims at ‘creating 
a globally recognized, dynamic, sustainable and competitive region which is 
attractive for businesses and visitors and where people want to live, work and 
invest’. (Inforegio 2011b) 
 EUSBSR Seed Money Facility – an EU funding program that helps to prepare 
projects that contribute to the priority areas or horizontal actions of the EUSBSR. 
During the project, partners who are successful in applying for the funding will 
draft a plan that can be further developed into a full proposal to any of the EU or 
national funding sources. (Seed Money Facility 2015)
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
BSR digital cooperation today 
 
Having explored the conditions for developing digital cooperation in the BSR, the final 
chapter aims to explore the BSR digital networks defined in section 2.2.2. For this, a set 
of questions (see Appendix 2) were discussed with the representatives of each of the 
networks. Broadly speaking, the questions can be categorized into four distinct topics that 
all contribute to a comprehensive understanding of BSR digital cooperation – the 
individual experience of the networks, the perceived interactions between various MLG 
networks, the BSR digital landscape in general and the commitment of the networks to 
DAE and EUSBSR as follows from the process-tracing. The aim was thereby to find 
observable patterns16 across the five examples that would complement the central case 
study.  
 
4.1. Network-specific insights 
In relation to their motivations, three out of five networks explored demonstrate a clear 
commitment to the BSR when asked about the reasons for establishing the network. 
Namely, the networks developed – in one manner or another – in response to the 
understanding that the BSR is a digital leader in the EU and this role needs to be 
strengthened even further by harnessing the existing cooperation potential. This general 
commitment, however, has slightly different nuances in each case. 
In case of Digital Baltic (interview D), the project is seen to proceed from the great 
potential that the BSR has in stimulating cooperation in the fields of open data and public 
sector information. Cooperation in these areas is perceived to have central importance in 
                                                          
16 A summary of the observable patterns is presented at the end of section 4.4. 
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placing the BSR in the forefront of the digital single market. In this, the case demonstrates 
a clear commitment to the EU digital single market agenda through a macro-regional 
context. Similar in its point of departure is the cyber cooperation pursued under the NB8 
(interview B), acknowledging that the (Nordic-Baltic) region is a digital leader in Europe 
and in relation to this, stronger and faster digital integration in the region should be 
pursued. In case of ToDE (interview A), the establishment of the network largely 
proceeds from the findings of a paper compiled by the BDF17, recognizing the BSR as a 
digital hub which has great potential in demonstrating practical results on the EU level 
and having the role of inspiring others to further innovate and cooperate.  
The logic behind the remaining two cases is somewhat different. As a non-profit 
organization, eGA (e-Governance Academy) has its main focus outside the region – many 
of their projects are instead targeted at increasing the governance-related competence of 
development countries in Central Asia and the Balkans. In this sense, the BSR TaxI 
project (interview E) is more of an exception with its BSR scope. However, the BSR is 
seen as a very good setting in which to advance cooperation as the region is very much 
intertwined and long-standing relations have already developed, making cooperation 
easier to flourish.  
With its cross-border dimension still in the development phase, X-Road Europe 
(interview C) is the least connected to the BSR scope out of the networks explored and 
even if the platform takes on a wider dimension of cross-border cooperation, it will be 
focused on Europe in general and not the BSR in specific. However, it is seen that the 
BSR is of crucial importance to these growth plans. Namely, the priority is to strengthen 
cooperation with neighboring countries – especially the Nordics – with whom Estonia 
already has close business contacts. As a supporting argument, cross-border cooperation 
in the BSR is seen as a priority as more Estonian residents live in nearby countries and 
one of the aims of X-Road is to make communication between Estonian citizens abroad 
and national authorities more efficient and convenient. These benefits are now also being 
promoted to other countries in an effort to export the solution. 
                                                          
17 ‘Priorities towards a Digital Single Market in the Baltic Sea Region’. Available at 
[http://www.bdforum.org/cmsystem/wp-content/uploads/Priorities-towards-a-Digital-Single-Market-in-
the-Baltic-Sea-Region_final_270313.pdf]. 
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When asked about the biggest success of the initiatives so far, many feel that the creation 
and development of the network as well as the increase of trust between the network 
members that boosts further cooperation have been the biggest accomplishments. In these 
lines, Digital Baltic, BSR TaxI, ToDE as well as the cross-border dimension of X-Road 
and the digital dimension of the NB8 are confirmed to be just emerging with the network 
members getting to know each other’s interests, needs and priorities and working towards 
defining common denominators which could lead to more tangible results.  
More specifically, though, one of the landmark achievements of the NB8 (interview B) is 
a non-paper on advancing the digital single market in the region, presented at the Nordic-
Baltic Prime Ministers’ meeting in October 2014. Another success was the US and NB8 
cyber round table in September 2014, which was seen to have a great added value in that 
good dialogue was strengthened with the US and the image of the region as a solid partner 
and digital leader was reinforced.  
In case of Digital Baltic (interview D), the open space meetings that were organized as 
part of the project activities are seen to have greatest value. Based on the quadruple helix 
model, public participation of the local communities was promoted in order to explain the 
nature of open data and encourage citizens to get involved, express their needs and 
expectations. Bringing together IT experts and developers from the one side and local 
citizens – including pensioners and students – on the other, these meetings resulted in 
many locally relevant innovative ideas to be pursued in the future. As such, the Digital 
Baltic project prioritizes citizen engagement on the local level. 
As an initiative that was launched very recently – in June 2014 –, the achievements of 
ToDE (interview A) have been reflected in its two publications18, participation in many 
digital seminars and the newly set up website. Until now, branding has not been high on 
the think tank’s agenda as establishing the network has been the concerted effort of just 
a few people.  However, more attention will be paid to this from now on with the EU 
already expressing its interest. As the cross-border dimension of the X-Road platform 
(interview C) is also just emerging, the biggest successes so far are adopting the solution 
                                                          
18 ‘Coding the future – the challenge of meeting future e-skill demands in the Nordic-Baltic ICT hub’ and 
‘Searching for the micro multinationals’, available at [http://topofdigital.eu/publications/].  
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in Finland and helping to test it in Sweden and Norway with the aim of disseminating the 
model and simplifying the development of cross-border e-services.  
In response to the question concerning the main beneficiaries who gain from the work 
of the established networks, all address through their specific scope and topics the needs 
of the citizens and businesses of the BSR. Digital Baltic (interview D), for instance, states 
explicitly that the aim of the project was to stimulate digital innovation in public sector 
information from the citizen perspective, exploring how this type of information 
influences citizens in the BSR and how it can be used along with modern ICTs to make 
the life of local citizens easier and practices more efficient.  
The same commitment to end-users can be observed in case of both X-Road Europe 
(interview C) and BSR TaxI (interview E) as they proceed from the understanding that 
automated access to (tax) information greatly benefits citizens and businesses, reflected 
in the quality and efficiency of the services provided to them. Thereby, as people’s 
mobility is ever-increasing and businesses strive for internationalization, cross-border 
cooperation in exchanging data is crucial in providing the means to do so. ToDE 
(interview A) acknowledges that their focus is mainly on the business sector – especially 
the competitiveness of the ICT industry and related start-ups – but also on improving the 
well-being of citizens in general. Given the close economic ties that exist between the 
countries of the region, the NB8 (interview B) finds that closer intergovernmental 
cooperation in digital matters also benefits the Nordic-Baltic citizens and businesses. 
Even though their role is mainly strategic, they promote the digital agenda on the highest 
levels and thus provide the framework for cooperation to ‘function’. 
An important indicator of the state of digital cooperation in the BSR is also the 
sustainability of the established networks. Here, it becomes obvious that the networks 
are still in their development phase, meaning that their sustainability in general might be 
questionable at this point of time, but their level of commitment to further steps can be 
distinguished more specifically.  
Most notably, the two projects explored – Digital Baltic and BSR TaxI (interviews D&E) 
– stress that work up to now has been focused on preparing the grounds for more practical 
cooperation, including mapping partner interests and capabilities in detail and specifying 
the next steps. In evidence of this, both have submitted new ‘full’ project proposals under 
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Interreg for continuing with the project activities. In case of Digital Baltic, the aim of the 
introductory project was to map both partner interests and citizen needs in open space 
meetings so that a new project could be submitted under Interreg BSR. The rationale is 
to give the network a more practical value so not to stay on the level of analytical activities 
only, thereby using the results of the regional open space meetings – ideas, 
recommendations, discussions – gathered in a preliminary study to reinforce the network 
and find complementarities with the work of the BDF in implementing the key priorities 
towards a digital single market in the BSR.  
In case of BSR TaxI (interview E), the full proposal has also been submitted under 
Interreg BSR, now involving even more partners for mutual synergies to develop. The 1-
year introductory project was designed to map the current situation in the field of 
international information exchange between tax boards, to find good practices and new 
solutions and to prepare for a larger cooperation project that would have a longer 
timeframe and more stakeholders to cover more BSR countries than up to now. The aim 
of the main project will be more tangible – to renew the processes of tax boards and the 
international interaction between information systems so to provide companies and 
citizens with safer, yet faster and more efficient services, helping to reduce tax fraud and 
tax evasion in the BSR. This will be accompanied by adapting data exchange solutions in 
the participating tax boards so it would be possible to access various databases on a cross-
border basis (e.g. by adopting the X-Road solution).  
In case of the NB8 (interview B), the future of its cyber dimension is not that well 
pronounced. The priority appeared for the first time during Estonia’s presidency in 2014 
and the next chairman, Denmark, has turned attention to the more pressing issues of 
energy security and the Eastern Partnership, especially concerning the situation in 
Ukraine and Russian media propaganda. However, this does not mean that the digital 
agenda will be completely discarded from the NB8 priorities – though Denmark did not 
take over the priority, Finland has made an unofficial commitment to these matters by 
e.g. organizing a cyber round table, though the meetings might not be as high-level as in 
the previous year. It is concluded that digital matters will probably not become overly 
important in the NB8 priorities19, but advancing cooperation in this area is nevertheless 
                                                          
19 As even now, these matters are raised in between other topics rather than tackled separately. 
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seen as a good opportunity to address this globally crucial topic that is intertwined with 
the growth of virtually all other areas of cooperation.  
In relation to X-Road (interview C), the aim is to further promote smooth cross-border 
data exchange and advance cross-border e-services. So far, the main efforts have been 
made towards Finland20. In essence, cooperation is discussed with any cross-border 
public agency that has close communication with the Estonian counterparts as exchanging 
data over the X-Road between these agencies would save substantial amounts of time and 
money. Also, there is a plan to establish a joint body with Finland to develop the X-Road 
and other e-governance information systems. The hope is that by the end of 2015, a 
concrete agreement will be reached for setting up this institute. As part of increasing its 
sustainability efforts, ToDE (interview A) is currently looking for both public and private 
actors that are interested in their focus areas to join the network as partners or sponsors.  
 
4.2. MLG interactions 
Overall, it seems in line with the observations of process-tracing that various levels of 
governance in the BSR digital landscape interact in the way that state actors (e.g. the 
ministries in the NB8 format) operate on a strategic level, promoting a suitable setting 
where cooperation could flourish, whereas civil society and sub-national actors (e.g. eGA 
and the local administrations in Digital Baltic) operate on a more practical, task-specifc 
level through e.g. cooperation projects. The general pattern thus confirms the theoretical 
assumption that states, despite losing their central importance, remain strategic gate 
keepers so that other governance levels would make their ‘creative contributions’ to the 
digital agenda and bring attention to areas where ‘more state’ is needed.  
For example, the NB8 interview (B) revealed the standpoint that mutual relations between 
states have central importance in advancing the digital agenda as states form the 
supportive framework – most notably through legislation (in e.g. data protection and 
privacy). This gate keeper role is seen as something non-state actors cannot affect that 
much, but these levels are recognized as complementary – for instance, changes might be 
                                                          
20 For instance, data exchange opportunities have been discussed with the Social Insurance Institution of 
Finland and the Finnish Population Register Centre. 
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initiated from bottom up if an innovative ICT business model was to emerge. Similarly, 
ToDE (interview A) has made a commitment to influencing the strategic agenda of the 
BSR by taking initiative and promoting cross-dialogue on the regional level. Thus, it is 
stressed that digital growth should not be driven top-down only in an effort to provide the 
suitable setting for new initiatives, but it is also crucial to promote growth from other 
levels so to instigate changes on the strategic level that further boosts mutual synergies. 
The states are there to support, but for cooperation to occur, political will is needed as 
well – and this is often fuelled by developments on other levels instead. It is therefore 
recognized that it is the various combinations of actors and states in networks that drive 
digital cooperation.  
The pattern that states provide the means for cooperation and other MLG actors realize 
these opportunities, thus, is not always that explicit. In case of the BSR TaxI project 
(interview E), a civil society actor in the example of eGA is promoting cooperation 
between public agencies – tax boards. At the same time, tax boards cooperate with 
agencies responsible for state information systems in the respective countries and when 
necessary, the private sector (i.e. technology companies) are involved for developing 
technical solutions. In this case, a rather complex interaction of MLG has already 
developed. 
Another interesting example of the blurred roles of MLG actors is the X-Road platform 
(interview C). If it is usually the case that the private sector provides the technology for 
public sector innovation (e.g. by developing e-service platforms), then in case of X-Road, 
the technology has been advanced by a public agency – the Estonian Information Systems 
Authority –, whereas several enterprises and civil society actors, most notably eGA, deal 
with disseminating and selling the X-Road idea to other countries. As such, the state does 
not sell the solution to other countries and it does not have the resources to provide 
guidance to all those interested in the platform, but other MLG actors help to promote the 
solution across borders by demonstrating its benefits in various cooperation contexts.  
In case of Digital Baltic (interview D), the sub-national actors that are involved as project 
partners similarly advance the wider national and regional cause. Võru County 
Government, for example, sees itself as fulfilling a marketing role, driving the Estonian 
digital image by demonstrating innovative solutions on the sub-national level and raising 
64 | P a g e  
 
wider awareness. In line with the fact that the County Government is an extension of state 
power21, it is perceived that the state should have the main role in driving the digital 
agenda by coordinating the respective regulations that foster growth. This, of course, 
complies with the key topics that the County Government along with the other partners 
pursue in the Digital Baltic project – public sector information as information that is 
directly generated by public institutions can mainly be tackled in a top-down approach. 
However, the project itself has included regional ICT clusters and research institutes as 
supporting partners so that the economic value of PSI would also be accounted for. 
 
4.3. BSR digital landscape 
In order to explain digital developments in the BSR, it was first of all explored why the 
networks have a macro-regional scope and what is the perceived added value from 
such cooperation. Four main justifications appeared – the networks have a BSR scope 
because (i) it is most beneficial to cooperate with the closest neighboring countries, (ii) 
the BSR consists of digitally advanced countries, (iii) the BSR already has a well-
established cooperation landscape, and (iv) the BSR macro-region has motivating funding 
opportunities.  
In case of X-Road Europe (interview C), it was stressed that although the initiative does 
not exclusively focus on the BSR, the macro-region is seen as an area of great potential 
for spreading the X-Road solution as cross-border cooperation is already very active and 
the countries are rather similar in terms of their (business) culture, aiming for simplicity 
and efficiency. As it makes sense to first advance cross-border data exchange with the 
closest neighbors that most likely have bigger communities of compatriots (e.g. Estonians 
in Finland) and thus benefit the many, it is a logical aim to try and implement the X-Road 
solution in the closest countries, increasing the willingness of other countries of the region 
to adopt it thereafter. As a validated model that supports European single market 
principles, X-Road could thus spread all over Europe.   
The funding argument is evident in case of both Digital Baltic and BSR TaxI (interviews 
D&E). In case of Digital Baltic, for example, it is stressed that the BSR setting provides 
                                                          
21 The Government of Estonia appoints the County Governors. 
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a motivating financial framework through project funds (see also section 3.4), which 
ensures that issues important on the EU and regional level are addressed on lower levels 
of governance. As a signal that digital topics are high on the regional agenda, thus, the 
funding offered for tackling the respective challenges ensures that new initiatives are 
established in this field. eGA adds that the BSR TaxI project had a regional focus for very 
pragmatic reasons that proceed from the topic addressed – Estonia gains the most from 
advancing cooperation in its region so that e.g. the Estonian Tax and Customs Board 
would have better collaboration with those countries with whom information is 
exchanged the most. Of course, requesting information directly from databases (e.g. 
based on the X-Road solution) would benefit the whole Europe, but this presumes a long 
process of changing the current patterns of thought and action. The BSR as a 
technologically advanced and innovative region, in this sense, is a good testbed for 
piloting these solutions and demonstrating the benefits to the wider EU community.  
In case of ToDE (interview A), the leading position of the BSR in the digital field is also 
emphasized as a reason for launching a digital think-tank specifically with a BSR focus. 
Hereby, a degree of path dependency clearly has to be taken into account – as already 
mentioned, ToDE to a great extent grew out of the wider activities of the BDF, which has 
operated as a networking organization in the BSR for almost 17 years. Last but not least, 
the NB8 format (interview B) can be argued to not have a BSR focus in the first place, 
excluding Germany and Poland from its scope and covering Iceland and Norway instead. 
However, a new cooperation format under the NB8 is also beginning to emerge – the 
NB6+2, which includes all the six Nordic-Baltic countries that belong to the EU as well 
as Poland and Germany to ‘complete the region’. This format is currently on the level of 
political consultations only and does not have regular meetings nor a clear agenda, so it 
makes sense to talk of the cyber agenda under the NB8 framework for now.  
The second topic discussed under this section concerns the key topics that should be 
promoted under the BSR digital cooperation agenda. Here, the networks demonstrate 
a commitment to a wide range of issues crucial to advancing the digital agenda, most of 
which have already been described based on network-specific insights. As a general 
pattern, however, the main focus seems to be on working towards seamless systems for 
cross-border data exchange between the BSR countries. 
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For example, the NB8 (interview B) prioritizes cross-border data exchange between NB8 
administrations. It is stressed that the respective technology does not need to be 
reinvented – Estonia has been using the X-Road solution domestically for more than 15 
years. In line with this, a future step might be to set up an NB8 regional data exchange 
layer that would link together relevant national digital architecture or data exchange 
platforms. The central importance of the X-Road solution is also emphasized in other 
cases. Digital Baltic (interview D), for example, sees the potential of X-Road in building 
a platform for local communities. As the residents of rural areas are typically more 
isolated, this digital solution could solve the problem by automating and concentrating 
relevant information and advancing means of citizen engagement (e.g. participatory 
budgeting). Similarly, eGA (interview E) sees that their project experience enables them 
– in combination with X-Road – to pursue cooperation in many other areas where cross-
border e-services would simplify the work of agencies and benefit the citizens22.  
One of the central topics discussed, however, concerned the barriers of BSR digital 
cooperation that the networks were asked to explain based on their experience. In 
general, four main sets of barriers appear – technological, legislative, social and financial 
barriers. The technological dimension is thereby related to both the ‘digital divide’ 
between the countries of the BSR in general as well as the separately developed digital 
systems and platforms in specific. The legislative dimension is mainly about differences 
in the data protection and privacy laws of the countries and the complexity of changing 
them. The social aspect is related to the unwillingness perceived by many actors to 
introduce fundamental changes to outdated (governing) practices. It is also felt that the 
financial framework for regional projects might not sufficiently motivate intensified 
digital cooperation.  
In the case of Digital Baltic (interview D), the main obstacle lied in differences between 
the project partners. Discrepancies in the levels of digital development were perceived so 
strongly as to even say that practical cooperation was difficult to drive. It is felt to be the 
case that all partner countries have great digital examples in the private sector, but the 
                                                          
22 E.g. cross-border requests from population registries, e-health (incl. health records, medicine 
prescriptions and health insurance information), social security, commercial registries, e-police (incl. 
traffic violations, information about licenses and traffic insurance), education information (diplomas, 
certificates) etc. 
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capacity of adopting these solutions in the public sector and translating them into benefits 
in e.g. e-governance is limited. Once again, Estonia is pointed out as an exception as 
digital technologies have also been very actively developed on the national level, which 
has worked well as an innovation model. In these lines, Võru County Government 
perceived its role in the project as explaining the Estonian experience to its partners23. 
Even if Võru did not have the chance to take its practices to a new level, however, it is 
strongly believed that experience sharing and knowledge transfer through networks is 
crucial in diminishing the digital divide and thus enabling more practical cooperation.  
In the lines of social factors, the X-Road experience (interview C) has shown that the 
main obstacle for intensified regional cooperation in digital areas is the cultural and 
technological conservativeness of both the public and private sector, including the 
unwillingness or incapability to give up on or drastically modify existing information 
systems that have already been extensively invested in. This is believed to be the case 
even if major shortcomings are experienced and admitted and even if better solutions are 
available. Because of this, it is difficult to bring all stakeholders together to explain the 
benefits of e.g. a mutually operating data exchange platform. Thus, the greatest obstacle 
is perceived to be the existing organizational and technological legacy which prevents 
actors from making changes in their current patterns of thought and behavior. Similarly, 
the Digital Baltic (interview D) project recognizes that in most of the cases, relevant 
actors are ‘hiding behind’ the claim that digital systems are unreliable, whereas it just 
takes a lot of time and resources to make changes. In these lines, it is important to 
overcome the overall lack of trust for digital services and a resistance to open up data 
through step-by-step action.  
The NB8 (interview B) also emphasizes technological barriers. As a simple example, it 
is pointed out that currently, all Nordic-Baltic countries besides Estonia and Finland24 are 
developing their own digital signature solutions, at the same time duplicating efforts as 
well as resources and making things more complicated for the end-users. Thus, the 
technological barriers are even now being amplified despite realizing the digital single 
                                                          
23 The other partners were interested in continuing this kind of knowledge sharing even further – the 
Lithuanian partner will even submit a separate proposal for exchanging experiences between the same 
partners. 
24 Who are together moving towards the .bdoc format in digital signing. 
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market as a common goal. The single market obviously has more potential if systems are 
compatible, thus it is seen as unfortunate that other countries have not been interested in 
adopting e.g. the X-Road system. ToDE (interview A) refers to the current situation as 
‘national protectionism’, whereby everyone seeks to develop their own innovative 
solutions, but thereby fail to look across borders.  
Leading the BSR TaxI project, eGA (interview E) experienced legislative barriers first-
hand. Namely, the aim of the follow-up ‘main’ project is to add new partners to the tax-
related network, but instead, it turned out that the Swedish partner who participated in the 
preparatory project has to withdraw from further activities. The reason for this lies in the 
national data protection laws that do not enable other countries to make inquiries in 
Swedish national databases through a system to the likes of the X-Road. Thus, in this 
case, the biggest obstacle is not as much related to the technical side, but about 
introducing time-consuming legal changes25. 
eGA adds another dimension to the already mentioned barriers. Namely, it is felt in 
relation to structural funds that resources tend to concentrate in the hands of public 
agencies, thus hindering the emergence and effective cooperation of networks on other 
governance levels. For instance, a new measure that is concerned with raising awareness 
on information society prioritizes public e-services and service infrastructures, but no 
attention is paid to the bottom-up citizen aspect and educating citizens about the 
opportunities of e-democracy – eGA thus feels that there should be more balance between 
developing e-services and e-participation.  
Continuing with the financial dimension, eGA agrees that BSR digital cooperation is to a 
great extent influenced by the (financing) priorities of the EU and the specific topics that 
are currently favored in the respective regional cooperation programs. eGA points to the 
fact that if in the previous EU financing period (2007-2013), the topic of information 
society (incl. e-governance and e-participation) was defined as a separate topic in several 
cooperation programs, then during this period (2014-2020), digital cooperation is seen as 
a horizontal topic. In other words, in all conceivable areas, it is expected that projects use 
                                                          
25 This is seen more problematic than e.g. developing interactions between databases, although these 
have also been set up independently from each other with no attention to how interoperability could be 
achieved. 
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the opportunities of information society so to improve cooperation. At the same time, 
there is no topic specifically for advancing information society, so it is hard to find 
financing for these networks and projects that want to address digital topics in detail and 
do not have their main focus in other cooperation areas. This way, digital cooperation 
might remain under-developed.  
So what, in general, should be done to boost digital cooperation in the BSR? Most of 
the interviewees believe that the answer lies in disseminating practical examples and 
success stories that incentivize the efforts to cooperate, change and harmonize. For 
instance, the NB8 (interview B) claims that the BSR could boost digital cooperation by 
demonstrating specific solutions that have already been proved successful. As a result, 
political will and trust – both crucial for advancing the regional cause – could be 
increased. ToDE (interview A) shares this standpoint and adds that if examples relevant 
to the whole region can be demonstrated, the key stakeholders will realize the benefits of 
joint solutions. Up to now, there have been many good initiatives here and there, but 
nothing substantial has been achieved together.  
Digital Baltic (interview D) believes that although practical cooperation is not always 
possible to begin with, this is not the only goal – building networks, sharing experience 
and increasing trust between its members is a time-consuming, but crucial step in 
advancing cooperation. This is exactly what is perceived to be happening in the BSR – 
the region is in the phase of creating networks in an attempt to find partners with whom 
to advance the digital cause. In order to boost these processes and speed up innovation, 
the benefits of cross-border digital solutions should be demonstrated so to outweigh the 
involved effort. In bringing more attention to the regional level, academic research is also 
seen as having an important role (interview B) – there are already plenty of speculations 
and prognoses, but not enough academic attention to digital matters that would strengthen 
cooperation arguments. As such, the pool of relevant research should be extended in order 
to keep convincing other countries to adopt joint digital solutions.  
Digital Baltic (interview D) also stresses the importance of empowering citizens. 
Involving citizens in the innovation process will, first and foremost, offer them the 
possibility to express their needs and ideas and influence the products and services that 
they are most affected by. As such, the innovation process should be given a more bottom-
70 | P a g e  
 
up perspective to counterweight the top-down perspective and thereby democratize the 
innovation processes. Therefore, it is important to bring together all stakeholders and 
enable knowledge and information flows to boost creativity. The same was perceived in 
case of BSR TaxI (interview E), stating that in order for real progress to occur, it is not 
enough to develop bi- or trilateral relations – the aim should be to involve all relevant 
stakeholders in generating and implementing ideas so to avoid duplication and lock-ins.  
 
4.4. Relation to EUSBSR and DAE 
Finally, the experts were asked to comment on the extent to which the priorities of the 
EUSBSR and DAE are perceived to be relevant to the networks. In line with the results 
of process-tracing, both strategies were indeed seen as crucial to the development of the 
networks with some deviations depending on the main focus of the network26. 
The NB8 (interview B) sees direct links between digital integration and its cyber priority, 
aiming to complement wider digital single market progress in the EU. The two main areas 
that the NB8 sees as paramount in contributing to the agenda is the creation of an 
environment that boosts innovation and the development of cross-border digital services 
both on the private and public level. In relation to the EUSBSR, it is felt that there are 
topics that collide with the NB8 priorities and the aim is to move towards avoiding 
duplication. At the same time, the EUSBSR is rather perceived as a separate institution 
with its specific initiatives and projects and not so as a strategic framework, making 
identifying with the EUSBSR more difficult for the NB8. 
The Digital Baltic (interview D) project makes a direct commitment to both the digital 
agenda as well as the EUSBSR. Firstly, it is emphasized that DAE is crucial for the 
development of a digital BSR society and thus needs to be the first priority for regional 
cooperation projects. Secondly, the project directly contributes to the EUSBSR on several 
levels, especially related to removing hindrances to the internal market in the BSR and to 
developing a common BSR strategy to promote services innovation. In its project, the 
                                                          
26 E.g. eGA also prioritized a Council Directive on administrative cooperation and Digital Baltic also 
prioritized a Council Directive on the re-use of public sector information. 
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Digital Baltic has also set as its goal to increase knowledge about DAE and digitization 
in the BSR.  
In case of BSR TaxI (interview E), the project is perceived to be very closely related to 
and even fuelled by EU digital single market topics and the EUSBSR. Most of all, the 
project is seen to be fully in line with the action of DAE that supports seamless cross-
border e-government services in the single market. In addition, the project contributes to 
the EUSBSR in establishing the region as a frontrunner in deepening and fulfilling the 
single market. After all, the Action Plan specifically refers to the need for international 
tax cooperation and reinforcing efforts to combat cross-border tax fraud and evasion27. 
In case of X-Road (interview C), it is stressed that RIA as a public agency receives its 
policy guidelines from the Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. 
On the higher level, however, a link is perceived with the EU information society 
objectives (mainly related to eID) through the Estonian Information Society Strategy28 
that proceeds from similar principles. The EUSBSR is not directly perceived to relate to 
the work RIA does in developing X-Road. On the contrary, ToDE (interview A) is in 
good dialogue with those responsible for the digital dimension of the EUSBSR and aims 
to link its activities in the future. In relation to DAE, ToDE recognizes its links, but rather 
seeks to inspire the EU level through good practices on the regional level, not to duplicate 
the agenda.  
  
                                                          
27 The proposal for the project itself was submitted under the priority area on removing hindrances to the 
internal market, where it is closely linked to the flagship project ‘cross-border e-services in the BSR’. 
28 Available in Estonian at [http://infoyhiskond.eesti.ee/files/Infoyhiskonna_arengukava_2020_f.pdf].  
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All in all, the keywords (observable patterns) that came up in discussing the four main 
topics can be summarized as follows: 
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Table 6: Expert interview keywords 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
 
4.5. Analysis: networked governance in BSR digital cooperation 
The last sub-chapter has the main aim of bringing together the set of theoretical 
assumptions developed in section 1.4 with the results of process-tracing and expert 
interviewing. This is accompanied with practical recommendations for further advancing 
the BSR digital cause.  
 
4.5.1. Validity of theoretical assumptions 
In order to test the theoretical assumptions of BSR digital cooperation, two 
methodological phases were completed – process-tracing the development of BSR digital 
cooperation and accounting for present-day BSR digital cooperation through identifying 
and categorizing the relevant governance networks along with their interconnections. 
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Based on these results, the revised and improved characteristics of BSR digital 
cooperation are the following. 
In pursuing digital cooperation on the regional level, aspects regarding geographical 
proximity are downplayed compared to the benefits of treating the region as a political 
project. The interviews revealed that in general, the BSR is perceived as both a political 
as well as a geographical entity. For example, several interviewees stated that the 
geographical proximity of neighboring countries is one of the main reasons why the 
network has developed. On the other hand, the BSR was also perceived as a macro-
regionalism project, in which case it was mainly associated with the EUSBSR as a leading 
regional initiative setting the pace of cooperation. In this sense, the BSR was seen as an 
active subject collectively pursuing its needs, i.e. to reinforce the image of the region as 
a digital frontrunner and as a role model for shaping the digital single market. The results 
of process-tracing also support the image of the BSR as a political project. Namely, the 
EUSBSR has taken the role of empowering the BSR as a regionalism project that strives 
for better integration, which is mainly related to keeping up competitiveness in the rather 
small countries of the region.  
An increasing number of digital cooperation networks on all levels of governance are 
observable in the region with the main aim of developing mutual relations and sharing 
experience. From the interviews, it indeed follows that digital cooperation in the BSR is 
characterized by a complex interplay of actors from various levels of governance – in this 
case the macro-regional, intergovernmental, national, civil society and sub-national 
levels. As digitization in general is a set of complex processes that need to be tackled 
through polycentric governing arrangements as the state alone cannot take responsibility, 
networks have emerged on each of these levels and are currently in the phase of learning 
and developing relations, paving the way for more practical cooperation. This, in turn, is 
in line with the results of process-tracing, stressing that the BSR should demonstrate 
effective digital cooperation through mutual projects, while creating no new 
(institutional) structures for tackling internal market issues. 
The observable digital cooperation networks are flexible, task-specific and need-based, 
while contributing to a mutually perceived common good. As discussed in the interviews, 
each of the governance networks have their own interests, needs and specific agendas, 
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but all make their ‘creative contribution’ to a shared end goal – the digital single market 
– thus enabling to treat them as various perspectives of BSR digital cooperation. Process-
tracing similarly revealed that BSR digital cooperation should develop on voluntary and 
need-based grounds, whereas the task-specific networks often emerge closely in line with 
the funding priorities of the time. The networks are thereby fluid in essence, especially 
when growing out of cooperation projects – as evidenced by the honorable mentions of 
other networks, several networks have dissolved after achieving their project objectives 
and discontinued as a network. The networks interviewed, on the other hand, expressed 
clear commitment and further plans to ensure the sustainability and durability of their 
activities.  
The governance system of digital cooperation is fragmented with no clear-cut 
interconnections and no central actors or decision-making. The just emerging nature of 
BSR digital cooperation is for example evidenced by the results of process-tracing, 
revealing that it is advised on the regional level to start bilateral discussions between 
neighboring countries that could lead to wider initiatives and gradual integration. The 
interviews also confirm that the digital governance system is still very fragmented and 
synergies have yet to develop, making the objective of laying down the patterns of 
interaction in detail complex. The general pattern is one where states provide a suitable 
setting for cooperation to occur and other levels contribute to realizing the priorities of 
the digital agenda through task-specific networks and projects. It can be however seen 
that this general pattern has several exceptions – eGA as a civil society player is boosting 
digital literacy in the public sector, RIA as a public agency has devised the core 
technological solution of Estonia’s e-governance, Digital Baltic as a project between sub-
national players contributes to public sector innovation through a bottom-up approach 
etc. Thus, it can be seen that various interactions and cross-dialogue between governance 
levels are developing. 
The role of states is to facilitate cooperation and act as a cooperation partner, diffusing 
power to both supra- as well as sub-national actors in a process of decentralization. In 
general, the interviews indeed reveal that states do not dominate digital cooperation, but 
are increasingly dependent on how effectively cooperation is driven with other 
governance levels. The results of process-tracing also reinforce the responsibility of states 
in promoting the deployment and usage of modern accessible online services, not 
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dominating the agenda. However, a strong notion of the central importance of states in 
pursuing the digital agenda still persists. Many feel that ultimately, the states are the one 
that should ‘lead the way’. In many cases, criticism is also targeted at states, including 
their incapability of driving digital innovation in the public sector and their unwillingness 
to adopt solutions developed by the private actors. This feature of BSR digital cooperation 
thus might have to be rephrased as ‘the role of states should be to facilitate cooperation…’ 
– currently, it seems that several actors feel that the role of states as ‘gate keepers’ and 
facilitators of digital cooperation has been insufficient. 
Digital cooperation in the region is mainly focused on exchanging information with the 
help of using modern ICTs and overcoming the related cross-border barriers. The results 
of the interviews confirm that digital cooperation in the BSR as expressed by the 
emerging cooperation networks is driven by the understanding of what ICTs have enabled 
(e.g. the X-Road platform is perceived to have central importance) and what needs to be 
achieved (i.e. a common goal of shaping a digital single market in the EU). Thereby, 
digital cooperation in the BSR has virtually become synonymous with mutually 
exchanging information via digital means, evidenced by the objectives of the explored 
networks in exchanging e.g. administrative and public sector information. The results of 
process-tracing support this as cross-border e-services are prioritized in the framework of 
the EUSBSR even on a formative level.  
In general, the theoretical assumptions were rather accurate in predicting the essence of 
BSR digital cooperation. Two features turned out to be somewhat arguable. Firstly, 
geography is still very much emphasized in the digital agenda of the BSR despite the 
understanding that digitization should diminish the importance of state borders. This can 
be explained by the overall effort of BSR countries to introduce cross-border e-services 
initially with neighbors as a step towards region-wide initiatives and deeper digital 
integration where borders, in this sense, would indeed no longer matter. Right now, the 
cooperation networks fuelling these developments were found to be in their early 
development stage, meaning that borders and the related barriers are still very much 
present. It can thus be said that geographical proximity has been an inseparable part of 
the development of the Baltic Sea macro-region in the first place, but the region is 
increasingly taking on a political function, articulating and pursuing the common interests 
of its members as evidenced by its digital agenda. 
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The second arguable feature is related to the role of states in fuelling digital cooperation. 
Overall, it seems that in many countries around the BSR, success stories and best practices 
have emerged on non-state levels of governance, but the ability of states to adopt smart 
solutions or translate innovative ideas into new ICT-based opportunities for their citizens 
and businesses has remained modest. As such, other levels of governance sense that the 
coordination and facilitation of digital cooperation by states is insufficient, leaving the 
full potential of multi-level cooperation in the BSR unused. This, in turn, is related to the 
wider ‘lesson’ of the complexity of digitization – although technology enables digital 
growth, it is ultimately the social networks that decide ‘what to make of it’.  
Overall, then, the kind of cooperation we are currently witnessing in the digital agenda of 
the BSR has developed in response to global digitization pressures that have facilitated 
two fundamental changes. Firstly, on the inter-state level, digitization is increasingly 
tackled macro-regionally as a defense mechanism for keeping up the competitiveness of 
the region and realizing the benefits of economies of scale in the otherwise small markets. 
The macro-regional image and cooperation incentives are thereby strengthened by the 
wider EU governance model, including its strategic guidelines and funding instruments. 
Secondly, on the intra-state level, digitization as a complex policy problem boosts 
decentralization processes, which in turn stimulate bottom-up initiative and local 
responsiveness. Thus, polycentric governance arrangements emerge whereby sub-
national actors develop practical responses to strategic goals while pointing to areas 
where top-down action is needed.  
Combining the inter-state and intra-state dimension, it can be said that a multi-level 
governance model that does not necessitate additional institutional structures is also 
emerging on the regional level, enabled by cross-border cooperation networks that 
collectively ‘engineer’ the BSR information society towards diminishing the barriers that 
state borders impose on digital growth. The greatest barriers, however, are not digital in 
essence – it is the lack of mutual trust and knowledge-sharing, unwillingness to undertake 
resource-intensive changes and low capacity to innovate that hinders effective and 
practical digital cooperation the most. The path to a digital single market is thus long and 
time-consuming, but the regional governance networks with their ‘creative contributions’ 
are clearly moving in the right direction.  
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4.5.2. Recommendations for advancing the BSR digital cause 
In combination of the theoretical observations and the lessons learned from the individual 
experience of the explored networks, the following practical recommendations could be 
proposed on various governance levels: 
 EU level – Develop (regional) funding instruments that tackle digital cooperation 
separately and specifically, not as a horizontal principle that prescribes the use of 
modern ICTs in all cooperation projects. Though digital cooperation enables 
growth in virtually all other areas, it has a distinct set of topics, objectives and 
barriers and thus cannot be properly advanced through cooperation projects that 
have their emphasis elsewhere (e.g. R&D, environment and labor issues).  
 BSR level – Facilitate further cross-dialogue and find synergies between various 
existing and emerging initiatives and develop cooperation models to be 
disseminated on the EU level. Currently, the governance system of BSR digital 
cooperation is still very much fragmented, but sectorial synergies need to be 
developed early on in order to avoid lock-ins and duplicating efforts. Also, digital 
topics should be further promoted in regional funding programs. 
 National level – Further incentivize and mobilize various actors to address digital 
issues through their specific contributions by expressing willingness to adopt new 
solutions and cooperate in e.g. innovating public sector practices. This is related 
to reinforcing the image of states as ‘gate keepers’, thereby shaping a favorable 
setting where digital cooperation could flourish, including reviewing legislation 
when necessary.  
 Sub-national level – Advocate specific digital topics and disseminate practical 
examples to bring more strategic attention to digital cooperation as well as point 
out areas where state action is needed for further intensifying cooperation. 
Wherever possible, business models that boost changes on the higher levels 
should be developed. Also, more academic research that argues for the benefits of 
tackling digital matters macro-regionally should be promoted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis set out to shape a wider understanding of the governing logic of BSR digital 
cooperation. A claim was made that global digitization pressures have received a macro-
regional response in the form of emerging cooperation networks on various levels of 
governance – from supra- to sub-national levels –, whereby each network offers their 
individual ‘creative contribution’ to a commonly perceived end-goal – developing a 
digital single market both in the BSR in specific as well as the EU in general.  
Combining the seemingly distant concept of regionalism, digitization and multi-level 
governance, a set of theoretical assumptions about the essence of BSR digital cooperation 
was proposed and the task of revising the theoretical premises according to real-life 
evidence was undertaken. For this, a two-step methodology was introduced. A 
retrospective view on the development of BSR digital cooperation was taken in process-
tracing the necessary conditions that fuelled the emergence of digital cooperation 
networks in the region. This short visit to the past was complemented by exploring the 
contemporary dynamics of BSR digital cooperation. Through mapping and expert 
interviewing, relevant governance networks were identified, categorized and studied in 
terms of their individual experience and mutual interconnections.  
In response to the first research question, it was found that digital cooperation in the BSR 
was conditioned by a combination of strategic and operational factors, whereas both are 
deeply interrelated with the pre-institutional setting of the BSR and its embeddedness in 
wider EU governance. The strategic level was mainly evidenced by changes observed in 
the overarching EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region according to the digital principles 
set out in the Digital Agenda of the Europe 2020 Strategy. Having acquired a clear digital 
dimension in its revised Action Plan, the EUSBSR now emphasizes the importance of the 
BSR as a frontrunner in ICTs to facilitate practical results in removing barriers to the 
regional single market and thus serve as a role model on the EU level. The presence of 
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EUSBSR and DAE objectives in regional cooperation networks was also confirmed in 
the interviews. The operational level complements the strategic one by offering financial 
incentives for various initiatives to realize the regional digital priorities through cross-
border cooperation targeted at practical results. Here, the main enabling instruments were 
found to be Interreg BSR, Interreg Central Baltic and the EUSBSR Seed Money Facility. 
A conclusion was thus reached that digital cooperation networks in the BSR have most 
likely emerged as a response to strategic goals and financial incentives. 
The second research question sought to confirm that the kind of digital cooperation we 
are currently witnessing in the BSR is indeed characterized by an emerging networked 
multi-level governance model. Through a mapping process, several digital cooperation 
networks that – in one way or another – contribute to bringing down digital barriers in the 
region were identified. These networks were categorized on five levels of governance – 
the macro-regional, intergovernmental, national, sub-national and civil society level – 
serving as various perspectives of the central case study of BSR digital cooperation. As 
such, it was proved that, although just in its development phase, a governance model 
whereby the regional information society is collectively constructed by governance 
networks on various levels beyond the state can be observed.  
The third research question aimed at characterizing this emerging networked governance 
model in detail by going back to the initial theoretical assumptions. For revising the 
assumptions, input was mainly gathered from process-tracing and expert interviewing the 
representatives of the networks. All in all, it was found that: 
 In pursuing digital cooperation on the regional level, aspects regarding both 
geographical proximity as well as the political nature of the BSR regionalism 
project are emphasized; 
 An increasing number of digital cooperation networks on all levels of governance 
are observable in the region with the main aim of developing mutual relations and 
sharing experience, after which more practical cooperation could be pursued; 
 The observable digital cooperation networks are flexible, task-specific and need-
based, while contributing to a mutually perceived common good of establishing a 
regional digital single market; 
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 The governance system of digital cooperation is very much fragmented with no 
clear-cut interconnections and no central actors or decision-making, whereas the 
ultimate aim is to move towards gradual integration; 
 The role of states, which are currently perceived to be somewhat 
underperforming, should be to facilitate cooperation and act as a cooperation 
partner, diffusing power to both supra- as well as sub-national actors in a process 
of decentralization; 
 Digital cooperation in the region is mainly focused on exchanging information 
with the help of using modern ICTs (like the X-Road solution) and overcoming 
the related cross-border barriers, which concern technical, legislative, social and 
financial aspects. 
As the BSR is the EU’s first macro-regional project, these insights into an emerging 
networked MLG model embedded in wider EU governance serve as real-life evidence of 
where policy-making and implementing practices might be heading in the EU, i.e. 
pursuing gradual integration through macro-regional cooperation. Besides exploring the 
BSR digital cooperation case in more detail29, thus, further research could also focus on 
the other, more recently formalized EU macro-regions – the Danube Region, the Adriatic 
Ionian Region as well as the Alpine Region – and the form digitization takes there30. Just 
like the current BSR digital cooperation was found to be about learning from each other’s 
experience, the aim could thus be to transfer knowledge between macro-regions, 
especially as the ultimate goal – shaping a single digital market in the EU – should be 
mutually acknowledged.   
                                                          
29 E.g. studying specific governance levels – BSR sub-national digital cooperation, BSR intergovernmental 
digital cooperation etc. – or the key topics that are tackled macro-regionally – public sector information, 
open data, e-government solutions, cross-border e-services etc. Other topics that deserve special 
attention include the potential of the X-Road platform for enabling smooth data exchange in the BSR, the 
role of public participation and citizen engagement in boosting regional digital innovation, the possibility 
of piloting mutually acknowledged digital signatures in the BSR, ways of moving from central e-
government solutions to e-governance solutions etc.  
30 For instance, the conditions that produced digital cooperation in the BSR might not be filled in case of 
other macro-regions, especially in what concerns a pre-institutionalized setting and highly digitized 
member countries. On the other hand, these regions too are embedded in wider EU governance, so it 
would be interesting to explore the outcome of digitization pressures and strategic EU digital objectives 
in this case, especially the extent to which the digital single market is perceived as a common goal.  
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KOKKUVÕTE: LÄÄNEMERE REGIOONI DIGIKOOSTÖÖ 
 
Selle magistritöö eesmärgiks on kujundada laiem pilt Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö 
toimimisloogikast. Töö lähtub arusaamast, et ülemaailmne digitaliseerumissurve on 
Läänemere ümber saanud makro-regionaalse vastuse. Nimelt on erinevatel 
valitsemistasanditel – riigiülesest kohaliku tasandini – ilmnemas koostöövõrgustikud, mis 
panustavad ühisesse lõppeesmärki – arendada nii Läänemere regioonis kui Euroopa 
Liidus üldiselt välja digitaalne siseturg. Selle areneva mitmetasandilise valitsemismudeli 
uurimiseks Läänemere regiooni digikoostöös seab töö kolm uurimisküsimust: 
 Kuidas on digikoostöö Läänemere regiooni kontekstis välja arenenud? 
 Kuidas väljendub mitmetasandiline valitsemine Läänemere regiooni tänapäevases 
digikoostöös? 
 Milline on Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö vorm tänasel päeval? 
Uurimistöö teoreetiline osa ühendab digikoostöö kolm kontseptuaalset põhikomponenti 
– regionalism, digitaliseerimine ja mitmetasandiline valitsemine – ning pakub välja rea 
oletusi Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö vormi kohta. Nende teoreetiliste oletuste 
parandamiseks ja täiendamiseks elulise tõendusmaterjali põhjal kasutatakse kaheetapilist 
metodoloogiat. Esmalt uuritakse Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö arengut 
tagasivaatavalt, rakendades protsessi jälgimise meetodit nende tingimuste tuvastamiseks, 
mis võimaldasid ja soodustasid regioonis digitaalsete koostöövõrgustike teket. Teisalt 
uuritakse minevikusündmuste kõrval ka Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö tänapäevast 
toimimist. Selleks kaardistatakse erinevatel valitsemistasanditel tekkinud olulisemad 
koostöövõrgustikud ning kasutatakse ekspertarvamusi, et hinnata võrgustike kogemust, 
omavahelisi seoseid ning panust Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö kujundamisse.  
Esimese uurimisküsimuse vastusena võib öelda, et Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö 
kujunemise eeldusteks olid nii strateegilised kui operatiivsed tegurid, kusjuures mõlemad 
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on tihedalt seotud Läänemere regiooni institutsionaliseerunud keskkonna ning 
paiknemisega laiemas Euroopa Liidu valitsemissüsteemis. Strateegiline pool avaldub 
peamiselt Läänemere regiooni strateegia muudatustes vastavalt Euroopa 2020 strateegia 
digitaalse tegevuskava põhimõtetele. Läänemere regiooni strateegia on oma täiendatud 
tööplaanis omandanud seega selge digitaalse mõõte, kus rõhutatakse Läänemere regiooni 
rolli IKT liidrina ning seatakse eesmärgiks praktiliste tulemuste soodustamise regionaalse 
digitaalse siseturu barjääridest ülesaamisel ning eeskuju näitamisel kogu Euroopa Liidus. 
Strateegilist poolt täiendab seejuures operatiivne pool, mis seisneb erinevatele algatustele 
rahaliste stiimulite pakkumises regionaalsete digieesmärkide elluviimiseks läbi 
praktilistele tulemustele suunatud piiriülese koostöö. Siinkohal on peamisteks 
soodustavateks instrumentideks Interreg Läänemere regiooni programm, Interreg Kesk-
Läänemere programm ning Läänemere regiooni strateegia seemnerahastu programm. 
Seega võib öelda, et digitaalsed koostöövõrgustikud arenevad Läänemere regioonis 
peamiselt strateegiliste eesmärkide ja rahaliste stiimulite koosmõjul. 
Teise uurimisküsimuse eesmärgiks on tõestada, et seda digikoostöö vormi, mida võib 
hetkel Läänemere regioonis täheldada, iseloomustab tõepoolest väljakujunev 
mitmetasandilise valitsemise mudel. Kaardistamise käigus tuvastati mitmeid digikoostöö 
võrgustikke, mis ühel või teisel moel panustavad regiooni digitaalsete barjääride 
vähendamisse. Võrgustikke võib seejuures leida erinevatelt valitsemistasanditelt – 
makro-regionaalselt ja valitsustevaheliselt riikliku, kohaliku ja kodanikuühiskonna 
tasandini välja –, ning neid käsitleti Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö erinevate 
perspektiividena. Niisiis tõestati, et kuigi täheldatav valitsemissüsteem on alles 
arenemisjärgus, on Läänemere regioonis tekkimas mudel, kus eri tasanditel paiknevad 
valitsemisvõrgustikud kujundavad ühiselt regiooni infoühiskonda. 
Viimase uurimisküsimuse eesmärgiks on iseloomustada Läänemere regiooni 
digikoostöös arenevat võrgustunud valitsemismudelit vastavalt teoreetilises osas 
väljapakutud oletustele. Nende oletuste täiendamiseks saadi sisendit nii protsessi 
jälgimise kui ekspertintervjuude tulemustest. Kokkuvõttes võib öelda, et: 
 Makro-regionaalse digikoostöö edendamise põhjusteks on nii riikide 
geograafiline lähedus kui ka Läänemere regiooni regionalismiprojekti poliitiline 
iseloom; 
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 Läänemere regioonis võib märgata üha enam digikoostööle suunatud võrgustikke 
kõigil valitsemistasanditel, kusjuures nende arenevate võrgustike põhieesmärgiks 
on suhete loomine ja kogemuste vahetamine, mis on eelduseks praktilisema 
koostöö kujunemiseks; 
 Digikoostööle suunatud võrgustikud on paindlikud, ülesande- ja vajaduspõhised, 
panustades samal ajal ühisesse lõppeesmärki ehk regionaalse siseturu loomisse; 
 Digikoostöö valitsemissüsteem on veel üsnagi killustunud ning selged 
vastastikused suhted ja kesksed juhid puuduvad, suund on aga järk-järgulise 
integreerumise poole; 
 Riikliku tasandi roll peaks olema soodustada koostööd ning tegutseda teiste 
tasandite jaoks koostööpartnerina, kuid hetkel tunnetavad mitmed võrgustikud 
riikide poolset apaatsust digikoostöö edendamisel; 
 Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö keskendub andmevahetusele IKT lahedusi 
rakendades (nt X-tee platvorm) ning vastavate piiriüleste barjääride ületamisele, 
millega seonduvad nii tehnilised, juriidilised, sotsiaalsed kui finantsilised 
aspektid.  
Seega võib täheldada, et kuigi digitaliseerumisprotsessid peaksid muutma geograafilise 
paiknemise ja riigipiirid tähtsusetuks, on Läänemere regiooni digikoostöö kontekstis 
arenemas kaheksat riiki hõlmav valitsemismudel. Selle koostöövõrgustike keskse mudeli 
eesmärgiks on kujundada Läänemere regiooni infoühiskonda kollektiivselt, et tõsta 
regiooni ning tema liikmesriikide IKT-alast konkurentsivõimelisust ning rakendada 
suuruse-eeliseid, mida riikide suhteliselt väikeseid turge arvestades oleks muidu võimatu 
saavutada. Laiemas plaanis on selle makro-regionaalse valitsemismudeli sihiks aina 
süvenev digi-integratsioon Euroopa Liidus, kuid praktilisema digikoostöö 
võimaldamiseks on tarvis esmalt suurendada regiooniülest usaldust, teadmusülekannet ja 
innovatsioonivõimekust – see ongi praeguste koostöövõrgustike fookuses.   
85 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alter, S. (2010). Integrating Sociotechnical and Technical Views of e-Services. – e-Service 
Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1.  
A User’s Guide to Political Science (2011). Process-tracing. – Government Department, 
Wesleyan University. Available at [http://govthesis.site.wesleyan.edu/research/methods-and-
analysis/ analyzing-qualitative-data/process-tracing/], accessed 8 February 2015. 
Baltic Development Forum (2012). Priorities towards a Digital Single Market in the Baltic Sea 
Region. Available at 
[http://www.handelskammaren.com/uploads/media/Priorities_towards_a_Digital_ 
Single_Market_in_the_Baltic_Sea_Region_final_120619.pdf], accessed 8 February 2015.  
Baltic Development Forum (2014a). About us. Available at [http://www.bdforum.org/baltic-
development-forum-introduction/], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Baltic Development Forum (2014b). Sustainable growth, innovation, competitiveness. Available 
at [http://issuu.com/bdforum/docs/baltic_development_forum#embed], accessed 24 February 
2015.  
Baltic Sea Year (2014). Estonian leadership in 2014. Available at [http://bsy.vm.ee/en/nordic-
baltic-cooperation/estonian-leadership-2014/], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Beach, D. and Pedersen, R. B. (2011). What is process tracing actually tracing? The three 
variants of process tracing methods and their uses and limitations. – Department of Political 
Science & Government, University of Aarhus.  
Bache, I. (2008). Europeanization and Multilevel Governance: Cohesion Policy in the European 
Union and Britain. – Governance in Europe, Rowman & Littlefield, 193 pp.  
Behr, T. and Jokela, J. (2011). Regionalism & Global Governance: The Emerging Agenda. – 
Notre Europe. Available at [http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/regionalism_ 
globalgovernance_t.behr-j.jokela_ne_july2011_01.pdf?pdf=ok], accessed 4 February 2015. 
Bennet, A. and Checkel, J. T. (2012). Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best 
Practices. – Process Tracing in the Social Sciences: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool, chapter 
1.  
Berkkan, C. M. B.; Olsen, U. K. and Tempel, L. (2009). Macro-regional Strategies in the EU 
– a New Form of Governance? – Roskilde University.  
Boman, J. (2005). Identity and institutions shaping cross-border cooperation: A comparative 
study of cross-border cooperation in the Estonian-Russian and Romanian-Moldovan 
borderlands. – University of Tartu, Department of Political Science.  
Breslin, S. and Higgott, R. (2000). Studying regions: learning from the old, constructing the 
new. – New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3. 
Bressers, J. Th. A. and O’Toole, L. J. Jr. (1998). The Selection of Policy Instruments: A 
Network-Based Perspective. – Journal of Public Policy, 18/3, pp. 213-239. 
86 | P a g e  
 
Calista, D. J. and Melitski, J. (2007). E-government and e-governance: Converging constructs 
of public sector information and communications technologies. – Public Administration 
Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1.  
Carino, L. (2003). The concept of governance. In Bautista et al. Introduction to Public 
Administration in the Philippines. – University of Philippines, National College of Public 
Administration and Governance.  
Central Baltic INTERREG IV A Program 2007-2013 (2010). BALLAD: Baltic Living Labs. – 
Central Baltic Program archive. Available at 
[http://archive.centralbaltic.eu/component/projects/278-cb/476-baltic-living-labs], accessed 
30 March 2015.  
Collier, D. (2011). Understanding Process Tracing. – Political Science and Politics 44, No. 4, 
823-30. 
Commission of the European Communities (SEC 2009a). Commission staff working document 
accompanying the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region action plan.  
Commission of the European Communities (SEC 2009b). Commission staff working document 
accompanying the communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region action plan. February 2013 
version. 
Cross-border cooperation on the electronic exchange of tax information in the Baltic Sea Region 
(BSR Taxl) (2015). – e-Governance Academy. Available at [http://www.ega.ee/BSRTaxI], 
accessed 24 February 2015.  
Digital Baltic – Digital Innovation in the Baltic Sea Region (2015a). About. Available at 
[http://digitalbaltic.eu/about/], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Digital Baltic – Digital Innovation in Open Data and Public Sector Information for the Baltic Sea 
Region (2015b). Available at [http://digitalbaltic.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Digital-
Baltic-Feasibility-Study.pdf], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Dumoulin, A. G. (2013). Public administration and the meta-governance of hierarchies, networks 
and markets. Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations. – Available at 
[http://www.ciat.org/index.php/en/blog/item/125-meta-gobernanza.html], accessed 12 March 
2015.  
Eggertsson, T. (2013). Quick guide to New Institutional Economics. – Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 41, pp. 1-5.  
E-Governance Academy (2011). Towards transparent, efficient and participatory future. – 
Available at [http://www.ega.ee/files/eGA%20brochure%202011.pdf], accessed 24 February 
2015.  
E-Governance Academy (2015). About us. Available at [http://www.ega.ee/about-us], accessed 
24 February 2015.  
e-SENS (2015). Electronic Simple European Networked Services. Available at 
[http://www.esens.eu/about-the-project/], accessed 30 March 2015.  
European Commission (COM 2010). Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. – Communication from the Commission. 
87 | P a g e  
 
European Commission (2015). How digital is your economy? New figures reveal progress needed 
towards a digital Europe. – Press release. Available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-4475_en.htm], accessed 25 February 2015.  
Faludi, A. (2012) Multi-Level (Territorial) Governance: Three Criticisms. – Planning Theory & 
Practice, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 197-211. 
Fichman, R. G.; Dos Santos, B. L. and Zheng, Z. (2014). Digital innovation as a fundamental 
and powerful concept in the information systems curriculum. – MIS Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 
2, pp. 329-353. 
Flyvberg, B. (2006). Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. – Qualitative Inquiry, 
Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 219-245. 
Friedrich, R.; Le Merle, M.; Gröne, F. and Koster, A. (2011). Measuring industry digitization 
– Leaders and laggards in the digital economy. – Booz & Company. Available at 
[http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Strategyand-Measuring-Industry-Digitization-
Leaders-Laggards-Digital-Economy.pdf], accessed 27 February 2015.  
Friedrich, R.; Le Merle, M. and Peterson, M. (2012). The Next Wave of the Digital Economy. 
– Strategy and Business Magazine, available at [http://digitaledition.strategy-
business.com/display_article.php?id=1139903], accessed 20 February 2015.  
Ganeshalingam, J. (2012). Multilevel Governance. EU Politics – PBWorks. Available at 
[http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25794792/Multilevel%20Governance], accessed 22 
February 2015.  
Hameiri, S. (2013). Theorising regions through changes in statehood: rethinking the theory and 
method of comparative regionalism. – Review of International Studies, Vol. 39:2, pp. 313-
335. 
Haque, S. and Pathrannarakul, P. (2013). E-Government towards good governance: A global 
appraisal. – Journal of E-Governance 36, pp. 25-34.  
Hettne, B. (2005). Beyond the ‘new’ regionalism. – New Political Economy, 10:4. 
Hettne, B and Söderbaum, F. (2006). Regional Cooperation: A Tool for Addressing Regional 
and Global Challenges. – International Task Force on Global Public Goods, Achieving Global 
Public Goods, Stockholm: Foreign Ministry. Available at 
[http://www.cris.unu.edu/uploads/media/ GlobalTaskForce.pdf], accessed 6 February 2015. 
Huppe, G. and Creech, H. (2012). Developing Social Capital in Networked Governance 
Initiatives: A lock-step approach. – International Institute for Sustainable Development. 
Available at [http://www.iisd.org/publications/developing-social-capital-networked-
governance-initiatives-lock-step-approach], accessed 12 March 2015.  
Hurrell, A. (1995). Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics. – Review of 
International Studies 21 (4), 331-358.  
Inforegio (2011a). Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-2013. Available at 
[http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/country/prordn/details_new.cfm?gv_PAY=EE&
gv_reg=ALL&gv_PGM=1293&LAN=7&gv_per=2&gv_defL=7], accessed 2 April 2015. 
Inforegio (2011b). Operational Programme ‘Central Baltic’. Available at 
[http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/country/prordn/details_new.cfm?gv_PAY=EE&
gv_reg=ALL&gv_PGM=1283&LAN=7&gv_per=2&gv_defL=7], accessed 2 April 2015.  
Katz, R. and Koutroumpis, P. (2013). Measuring digitization: A growth and welfare multiplier. 
– Technovation, No. 33, pp. 314-317.  
88 | P a g e  
 
Katz, R.; Koutroumpis, P. and Callorda, F. M. (2014). Using a digitization index to measure 
the economic and social impact of digital agendas. – Info, Vol. 16, Iss. 1, pp. 32-44.  
Katzenstein, P. J. (2005). A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
Kern, K. (2011) Governance for Sustainable Development in the Baltic Sea Region. – Journal 
of Baltic Studies, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 21-35. 
Kern, K. and Gänzle, S. (2013). ‘Macro-regionalization’ as a New Form of European 
Governance: The Case of the European Union’s Strategies for the Baltic Sea and the Danube 
Regions. – ISL Working Paper, University of Agder.  
Kern, K. and Löffelsend, T. (2004) Governance Beyond the Nation-State: Transnationalization 
and Europeanization of the Baltic Sea Region. – Discussion Paper, Social Science Research 
Center Berlin. 
Kristensen, G. N. (2011). EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region: A year after and beyond. – 
Baltic Journal of Economics, 11(1), 147-151.  
Langenhove, L. (2013). What is a region? Towards a statehood theory of regions. – 
Contemporary Politics, 19:4.  
Lenk, K. (2006). E-Government in Europe: Uniform solutions for all countries? – Information 
Polity 11, pp. 189-196. 
Linde, N.-L. and Espersen, L. (2014). Debate Article: Digital Growth through regional 
cooperation. – Baltic Development Forum. Available at [http://www.bdforum.org/debate-
article-digital-growth-regional-cooperation/], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Littoz-Monnet, A. (2010). Dynamic Multi-Level Governance – Bringing the Study of Multi-
Level Interactions into the Theorising of European Integration. – European Integration online 
papers, Vol. 14, Article 01.  
Mansfield, E. D. and Solingen, E. (2010). Regionalism. – Annual Review of Political Science, 
No. 13. 
Marcinkute, L. (2013). EUSBSR: Multi-level governance in the European Union Strategy for 
the Baltic Sea Region. Available at [http://www.transgovernance.eu/media/308824/3_ 
marcinkute_transgovernance.pdf], accessed 1 March 2015.  
Medrano, J. D. (2007). A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium 
(Katzenstein, P.). – American Journal of Sociology, Book Review, Vol. 112, No. 4.  
Misuraca, G. C. (2007). E-Governance in Africa: From Theory to Action. A Handbook on ICTs 
for Local Governance. – International Development Research Centre.  
Mpinganjira, M. and Mbango, P. (2013). Profiling non-users of e-government services: In quest 
of e-government promotion strategies. – Journal of Global Business and Technology, Vol. 9, 
No. 2.  
Navarra, D. D. and Cornford, T. (2012). The State and Democracy After New Public 
Management: Exploring Alternative Models of E-Governance. – The Information Society, No. 
28, pp. 37-45.  
Nye, J. S. (1968). Comparative Regional Integration: Concept and Measurement. – International 
Organization, 22:4. 
Norden (2014). Innovative Nordic Digital Solutions – Making the Nordic region a digital pioneer. 
Available at [http://www.nordicinnovation.org/projects/lighthouse-projects/innovative-
nordic-digital-solutions/], accessed 30 March 2015.  
89 | P a g e  
 
Nordic-Baltic cooperation (NB8) (2011). – Government Offices of Sweden. Available at 
[http://www.government.se/sb/d/14644/a/164947], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Nordic-Baltic Cooperation History (2014). – Baltic Sea Year. Available at 
[http://bsy.vm.ee/en/nordic-baltic-cooperation/nordic-baltic-co-operation-history/], accessed 
24 February 2015.  
North, M. (2012). Reinventing the Baltic Sea Region: From the Hansa to the EU Strategy of 2009 
– Romanian Journal for Baltic and Nordic Studies, 4(2), 5-17.  
Obydenkova, A. (2011). Comparative regionalism: Eurasian cooperation and European 
integration. The case for neofunctionalism? – Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2.  
Opening Up (2011). The Opening Up Project. Available at [http://www.opening-
up.eu/content/opening-project], accessed 30 March 2015.  
Piattoni, S. (2009a). Multi-Level Governance: a Historical and Conceptual Analysis. – Journal 
of European Integration, 31:2, pp. 163-180.  
Piattoni, S. (2009b). Multi-level governance in the EU: Does it work? – Globalization and 
Politics: A conference in Honor of Suzanne Berger.  
Press, Gil (2014). The Two Forces Driving the Internet of Things. – Forbes, available at 
[http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2014/11/30/the-two-forces-driving-the-internet-of-
things/], accessed 20 February 2015.  
Rebane, M. and Pajula, M. (2008). Nordic-Baltic Co-operation – Unity across borders. –
Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yearbook. 
Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the Implementation of the EU 
Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (2011). – Brussels, COM 381 final. 
RIA - Republic of Estonia Information System Authority (2013). Finland to create a data 
exchange layer on the example of the Estonian X-Road. – Available at 
[https://www.ria.ee/finland-to-create-a-data-exchange-layer-on-the-example-of-the-estonian-
x-road/], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Richardson, W. (2014) From digital collaboration to digital cooperation: new ways of working 
together in the modern world. – Partnership for 21st Century Skills, Vol. 1, No. 18. Available 
at [http://www.p21.org/news-events/p21blog/1516-richardson-from-digital-collaboration-to-
digital-cooperation-new-ways-of-working-together-in-the-modern-world], accessed 10 
February 2015.  
Rose, W. R. and Grant, G. G. (2010). Critical issues pertaining to the planning and 
implementation of E-Government initiatives. – Government Information Quarterly 27, pp. 27-
33. 
Ruhanen, L.; Scott, N.; Ritchie, B. and Tkaczynski, A. (2010). Governance: a review and 
synthesis of the literature. – Tourism Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 4, pp. 4-16.  
Savic, D. (2006). E-governance: Theoretical foundations and practical implications. – Available 
at [http://www.dobrica.savic.ca/pubs/egovernance_foundations.pdf], accessed 22 February 
2015.  
Scherbenske, S. L. and Hörnström, L. (2013). Implementing Multi-Level Governance in the 
Baltic Sea Region. – Nordregio, available at [http://www.partiseapate.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/01/Implementing-MLG-in-the-BSR-Nordegio-december-2013.pdf], 
accessed 21 February 2015.  
90 | P a g e  
 
Schmitter, P. C. (2007). Regional Cooperation and Region Integration: Concepts, Measurements 
and a Bit of Theory. – European University Institute. Available at 
[http://guaiba.unila.edu.br/sites/default/files/files/07%20REGIONAL%20COOPERATION
%20AND%20INTEGRATION2.pdf], accessed 14 February 2015. 
Schymik, C. (2011). Blueprint for a Macro-Region. EU Strategies for the Baltic Sea and Danube 
Regions. – SWP Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.  
Scott, J. W. (2003) Cross-border Governance in the Baltic Sea Region. – Regional & Federal 
Studies, 12:4, 135-153. 
Seed Money Facility (2015). EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. About Seed Money. 
Available at [http://seed.eusbsr.eu/index.php/about2], accessed 2 April 2015.  
Sevaldson, B. (2006). Digital cooperation across disciplines. Exchange of design data in 
inclusive, complex and hybrid processes. – Working paper for NORCODE.  
Spindler, M. (2002). New Regionalism and the Construction of Global Order. – CSGR Working 
Paper, No. 93/02.  
Stahl, G. (2009). The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Multilevel governance in action? – 
Annual Conference of BSSSC. Available at 
[http://www.bsssc.com/upload/dokumenty/f_59.pdf], accessed 22 February 2015.  
Stephenson, P. (2013). Twenty years of multi-level governance: ‘Where does it come from? 
What is it? Where is it going?’ – Journal of European Public Policy, 20:6, pp. 817-837.  
State Information Systems (2015). E-Governance Academy. Available at 
[http://www.riso.ee/et/node/4129], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Söderbaum, F. (2007). African Regionalism and EU-African Interregionalism. – European 
Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic 
Era. The International Political Economy of New Regionalisms Series, edited by Mario Teló. 
Söderbaum, F. (2004). Exploring the links between micro-regionalism and macro-regionalism. 
– Global Politics of Regionalism, available at [http://www.academia.edu/6106950/ 
Exploring_the_Links_between_Micro-regionalism_and_Macro-regionalism], accessed 20 
February 2015.  
The Baltic Institute of Finland (2010). eCitizen II – Towards citizen-centred eGovernment in 
European cities and regions. Available at [http://www.baltic.org/projects/ecitizen_ii].  
The Economist (2014). The third great wave. – Special report, the world economy. 
The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report: Building a More Competitive Europe (2012). – World 
Economic Forum, Insight Report. Available at [http://www3.weforum.org/docs/CSI/2012/ 
Europe2020_Competitiveness_Report_2012.pdf], accessed 20 February 2015.  
The Digital Baltic Project (2014). Available at [http://digitalbaltic.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/About-the-project-Digital-Baltic.pdf], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Top of Digital Europe think tank to promote the BSR a world leader in the digital economy 
(2014a). – Baltic Development Forum, available at [http://www.bdforum.org/tank-promote-
baltic-sea-region-world-leader-digital-economynew-tank-promote-baltic-sea-region-world-
leader-digital-economy/], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Top of Digital Europe – ICT Think Tank for the Baltic Sea Region (2014b). Available at 
[http://issuu.com/bdforum/docs/top_of_digital_europe_think_tank], accessed 24 February 
2015.  
Torfing, J. and Sorensen, E. (2009). Making governance networks effective and democratic 
through metagovernance. – Public Administration, Vol. 87, No. 2, pp. 234-258. 
91 | P a g e  
 
Torfing, J. and Sorensen, E. (2014). The European debate on governance networks: Towards a 
new and viable paradigm? – Policy and Society, No. 33, pp. 329-344.  
Võru County Government (2014). Digital Baltic – Promoting Digital Innovation in Public Sector 
Innovation. Available at [http://voru.maavalitsus.ee/digital-baltic], accessed 24 February 
2015.  
Väyrynen, R. (2003). Regionalism: Old and new. – International Studies Review, No. 5, pp. 25-
51.  
Willis, B. (2014). The Advantages and Limitations of Single Case Study Analysis. – e-
International Relations Students. Available at [http://www.e-ir.info/2014/07/05/the-
advantages-and-limitations-of-single-case-study-analysis/], accessed 2 April 2015. 
Wunderlich, J. U. (2013). Regionalism, Globalisation and International Order: Europe and 
Southeast Asia. – Ashgate Publishing. 
X-Road Europe (2014a). – Republic of Estonia Information System Authority. Available at 
[https://www.ria.ee/x-road-europe-en/], accessed 24 February 2015.  
X-Road Europe (2014b). About. Available at [https://www.x-road.eu/about.html], accessed 24 
February 2015.  
X-Road Factsheet (2014). – Republic of Estonia Information System Authority. Available at 
[https://www.ria.ee/public/x_tee/X-road-factsheet-2014.pdf], accessed 24 February 2015.  
Yi, C. (2007). Emergence of Regionalism: About State Preference Formation. – University of 
Leeds, School Politics and International Studies, POLIS Working Paper No. 23.  
Zoroja, J. (2011). Internet, e-commerce and e-government: Measuring the gap between European 
developed and post-communist countries. – Interdisciplinary Description of Complex Systems, 
9(2), pp. 119-133.  
  
92 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 – Overview of BSR digital cooperation networks 
 
Regional level – Top of Digital Europe 
Launched in June 2014 by the Baltic Development Forum (BDF) and Microsoft, Top 
of Digital Europe is a new independent think tank that promotes the BSR as a leader in 
the ICT sector. The aim of the think tank is to facilitate regional dialogue on how this 
leading role can be strengthened and to provide concrete recommendations as to how 
the digital economy can be further advanced. (Top of Digital Europe… 2014b) As the 
think tank itself stipulates, their specific objectives are to (Top of Digital Europe… 
2014a): 
 identify key issues and develop solutions related to the digital economy and 
ICT as a driver of growth; 
 strengthen competitiveness through innovative cross-border actions; 
 set the agenda by creating and stimulating a dynamic discussion on growth 
through ICT; 
 address decision-makers at regional, national and European level as well as 
key stakeholders. 
The think tank is hosted by the BDF, an independent non-profit networking 
organization that involves a wide range of partners, including businesses, governments, 
regional organizations and research and media institutions, altogether amounting to 
more than 8,000 contacts. The BDF provides platforms that bring together actors from 
diverse sectors and from across the BSR, promoting better cooperation, coordination 
and coherence, influencing regional policy-making and facilitating collaboration across 
regions, sectors and levels of decision-making. (Baltic Development Forum 2014a) For 
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more than 15 years, it has been the BDF’s core mission to promote regional public-
private partnerships through a strong network (Baltic Development Forum 2014b). The 
new ICT initiative underlines BDF’s role as an internationally leading think-tank and 
as a serious cooperation partner in the digital field. 
The first report of the think tank – Searching for the Micro-Multinationals31 – addresses 
the challenges faced by SMEs in the ICT sector in growing and expanding across 
borders. It seems that many SMEs in the BSR are hesitant to embark on global growth 
ventures, whereas some do not even have the ambition to grow and expand their 
business. The think tank puts forward several recommendations on how growth can be 
stimulated through public-private initiatives across national borders. Among these 
recommendations is the establishment of a Baltic Sea Academy for SMEs, which could 
develop ICT-related niche competencies through online classes and strengthen regional 
collaboration between businesses and universities. (Linde & Espersen 2014) The think 
tank has announced that topics to be investigated in the next reports include ICT skills 
and the educational system, talent attraction and retention, big data as a cross-border 
growth driver for web entrepreneurs and cross-border e-government services for 
businesses and citizens. (Top of Digital Europe… 2014b)  
 
Intergovernmental level – NB8 cyber cooperation 
The Nordic-Baltic cooperation or NB8 is a regional cooperation format that includes 
five Nordic countries – Finland, Sweden, Norway, Iceland and Denmark – and three 
Baltic countries – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. While the meetings initially took place 
in a ‘5+3’ format, it was decided in 2000 on the initiative of the Estonian foreign 
minister of the time, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, that the Nordic-Baltic cooperation format 
will be called the Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8), which expresses greater unity. (Nordic-
Baltic… 2014) Calling the cooperation format by the name of NB8 did not have any 
substantive implications, yet reinforced the image that the Nordic-Baltic region is 
represented by an intergovernmental framework which mainly functions on the 
political elite level. 
                                                          
31 Available at [http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/psrc/pdf/pwc-searching-for-the-micro-
multinationals.pdf]. 
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By now, the NB8 format has developed into a very well-established cooperation 
framework without creating separate structures of organizations for coordinating the 
everyday work. The presiding country is agreed upon annually and its responsibility is 
to determine cooperation guidelines for the respective year (Nordic-Baltic… 2014). 
The eight countries are consistently expanding their scope of cooperation, working on 
new channels in order to promote mutual values and safeguard security and stability 
also outside the region. Thereby, the NB6 is a separate cooperation format which 
embraces the NB8 countries that have joined the EU. The underlying aim is to reinforce 
the region as a model for cooperation for the EU and beyond, whereas the idea is not 
to develop the NB8 format into a regional organization, but rather to pursue a ‘close 
supra-structural cooperation format based on joint values and interests both on the 
political and practical level’. (Rebane & Pajula 2008: 48) The most important strategic 
document of the format is the NB8 Wise Men Report32, also known as the Birkavs-
Gade report after its authors. The report was published in 2010 and contains a number 
of concrete proposals as to how Nordic-Baltic cooperation can be deepened (Nordic-
Baltic… 2011).  
2014 was the Baltic Sea Year for Estonia – besides presiding in the NB8 format, 
Estonia also chaired Baltic cooperation both in the Baltic Assembly and the Baltic 
Council of Ministers and assumed the presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States, VASAB and HELCOM. The four priorities for the NB8 cooperation were cyber 
cooperation, Eastern Partnership, energy cooperation and security cooperation. In 
relation to cyber cooperation, the Ministry recognizes that cyber cooperation is gaining 
ground in the Nordic-Baltic area and Estonia has so far been the unofficial leader of 
this agenda. (Baltic Sea Year 2014) 
 
National level – X-Road Europe 
Led by the Estonian Information System Authority, Estonia’s public agency for central 
e-government solutions, X-Road Europe is a project that aims to facilitate the creation 
of innovative e-services both within member states as well as between countries (cross-
border e-services). It is a service-based architecture designed to enable the quick and 
                                                          
32 Available at [http://www.utanrikisraduneyti.is/media/Skyrslur/NB8-Wise-Men-Report.pdf].  
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inexpensive development, provision and use of new electronic services and enables 
data exchange in fields that do not yet have a pan-European technical solution. (X-
Road Europe… 2014a) As a secure and standardized data exchange environment for 
information systems, X-Road Europe could be used by public and private sector 
organizations to access public services in the EU (X-Road Europe… 2014b). 
X-Road Europe is based on the core technology of X-Road, which was commissioned 
by the Republic of Estonia in 2001. The environment was developed in order to save 
on the costs of bilateral data exchange between information systems. Another objective 
was to ensure high security and the up-to-date standardization of data exchange. Today, 
X-Road has become one of the key pillars of the Estonian e-state, including services 
such as declaring taxes electronically, checking one’s personal data (e.g. exam results, 
health insurance), submitting a residence application electronically etc. (X-Road 
Europe… 2014a) Today, over 2,000 services are used via X-Road in Estonia, used by 
over 900 organizations and 50% of Estonians (X-Road Factsheet 2014). 
In 2013, the Government of Finland announced the decision to implement the Estonian 
X-Road infrastructure. The aim, however, is not only to implement a similar 
environment to benefit Finnish citizens and enterprises in offering public services faster 
and at lower costs, but also to develop cross-border cooperation in e-services between 
Estonia and Finland. As the first pilot service, the Estonian Tax and Customs Board 
launched cooperation with the Finnish Tax Administration to bring cross-border data 
exchange to the X-Road channel (RIA 2013).  
 
Sub-national level – Digital Baltic 
Digital Baltic is a project promoting digital innovation in Public Sector Information 
(PSI) and Open Data in the BSR from a citizen perspective to establish the BSR at the 
forefront of developing a digital single market in the EU (The Digital Baltic… 2014). 
The point of departure is that PSI and Open Data are strongly underutilized in Europe 
and the potential economic value is high. Thus, there is a huge economic potential for 
the BSR to spur innovation within this field, especially among SMEs. (Digital Baltic 
2015a) 
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The short-term objective of the project is to ensure new innovations in the PSI sector 
by using the working method of Open Space33 (The Digital Baltic… 2014). The long-
term objective is to develop the Digital Baltic project and the partnership towards the 
next program period in the BSR, with the aim of demonstrating the BSR as a good 
example for the rest of Europe in developing a digital single market (The Digital 
Baltic… 2014). The main partners of the project are Värmland County Administrative 
Board (Sweden), Võru County Government (Estonia), Kaunas Regional Development 
Agency (Lithuania) and Hedmark County Council (Norway) with supporting partners 
from Sweden, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Norway and Denmark (Digital Baltic 
2015a). The project duration was 12 months – from January to December 2014 (Võru 
County Government 2014). 
According to the final report of the project (Digital Baltic 2015b: 9), the differences 
and gaps that exist between countries and regions in the BSR should not be allowed to 
grow larger. Collaboration between regions is seen to have a central importance within 
this thematic area to overcome the challenge and make the BSR a prosperous place to 
live in. The Digital Baltic project believes that by applying the quadruple helix 
innovation model by e.g. using the Open Space model, citizens are inspired to come up 
with new innovations and ideas that will increase the re-use of PSI and Open Data in 
the region.  
 
Civil society level – BSR TaxI 
The e-Governance Academy (eGA) is a non-governmental, non-profit organization 
founded for the purpose of creating and transferring knowledge concerning e-
governance, e-democracy and the development of civil society. The Academy was 
established as a joint initiative of the Government of Estonia, the Open Society Institute 
and the United Nations Development Program. The Academy was officially launched 
in 2002 and by today, eGA has cooperated with more than 50 countries. (e-Governance 
Academy… 2015) 
                                                          
33 Open Space meetings are gatherings where participants create and manage their own agenda in parallel 
working sessions around a central theme of strategic importance (Digital Baltic 2015a). 
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eGA promotes the use of ICT in the work of governments and in democratic practices. 
It provides training in e-governance and e-democracy, serves as a platform of exchange 
of experience and conducts related research. The primary target audience includes civil 
servants, policy makers and representatives of civil society. (State Information Systems 
2015) By training and advising leaders and stakeholders in using ICT, eGA contributes 
to increased government efficiency and improved democratic processes with the aim 
of building open information societies. (e-Governance Academy… 2015) The aim is 
to analyze and promote the use of best practices in the field of e-democracy, cyber 
security, ICT in education, local e-government and central e-government and 
underlying is the assumption that e-governance is much more than technology – it is 
also about management and coordination, legislation and regulation, planning and 
principles, frameworks and architecture. (e-Governance Academy… 2011) 
One project specifically focusing on the region is called BSR TaxI – cross-border 
cooperation on the electronic exchange of tax information in the BSR. Funded under 
the EUSBSR Seed Money Facility and running from January 2014 until March 2015, 
the project prepares the ground for a fast and secure exchange of tax-related 
information. The consortium gathers tax authorities and state agencies responsible for 
the development and maintenance of state information systems from three BSR 
countries – Estonia, Sweden and Latvia. Led by eGA, the partners have joined forces 
to improve the cross-border exchange of online tax information and the related delivery 
of government services to citizens. (Cross-border cooperation… 2015) 
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Appendix 2 – Interview outline 
 
Network-specific insights 
 What conditioned the establishment of the network? 
 What have been the biggest successes of the network? 
 Who are the main beneficiaries of the network? 
 How sustainable/durable is the network? What are the future plans/ultimate 
goal? 
MLG 
 Who are the network contributors? What is their role? 
 What is the role of various stakeholders (including public, private and civil 
society) in the network?  
 How do various levels interact/cooperate with one another? Why is it 
necessary? 
BSR digital landscape 
 Why does the network have a BSR scope? What is the added value of 
addressing digital matters macro-regionally? 
 What are the key topics that should be promoted under the BSR digital agenda? 
 What are the biggest barriers of BSR digital cooperation experienced by the 
network? What could the solution be?  
 What is the current situation of BSR digital cooperation? How could it be 
boosted? 
Relation to DAE and EUSBSR 
 How does the network relate to the priorities of (a) the EU Digital Single 
Market, (b) the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region? 
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Appendix 3 – Results of network mapping 
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